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CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
DOCTRINE: AGENCY RESPONSE AND CERTAIN
OTHER UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES
REBECCA ROSENBERG
ABSTRACT
Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code incorporates
the controversial judicial doctrine of economic substance into statutory language. In other words, it “codifies” the doctrine. (The economic substance doctrine generally provides that a tax benefit that
goes beyond Congressional intent can be disallowed by the courts,
even if the taxpayer meets all of the literal Code and regulatory
requirements for claiming the benefit.)
This codification appears to have accidentally dissuaded
the relevant agency (the Internal Revenue Service, or IRS) from
raising economic substance issues—an effect that is contrary to
Congress’s intent in enacting the doctrine into legislation. Essentially, Congress imported a set of judicial principles into the Code,
in order to make a particular judicial doctrine stronger, but then
the agency effectively discarded those now-codified judicial rules.
The IRS response to codification raises bigger picture issues,
such as an agency’s ability to disregard (or decline to enforce) a
statute and the parameters of an agency’s ability to issue public
guidance using informal means (rather than formal regulations).
In addition, this codification raises structural issues, including
the interaction between the three branches of government in this
context and the impact of Congressional approval on arguments
about the validity of this judicial doctrine. Lastly, such codification
places new emphasis on distinguishing between the now-codified
economic substance doctrine and other anti-abuse doctrines.
The economic substance doctrine has been the subject of
recent litigation in the “STARS” cases. One of such cases has just
Assistant Professor, Pettit School of Law, Ohio Northern University. Professor Rosenberg would like to thank her research assistant, Carter Brown.
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been appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and that appeal may later
result in a split between the circuits. In addition, the recent 2017
Tax Act (the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) may lead to more emphasis
on the economic substance doctrine, as taxpayers attempt to comply
with the letter of new tax provisions while arguably circumventing such provisions’ intent. For these reasons, the economic substance doctrine is likely to become increasingly important in the
near future. In addition, as the IRS attempts to implement and
provide guidance on a massive new tax act, there are likely to be
recurring issues regarding the limits of agency discretion to not
enforce a statute, and the use of informal means to communicate
guidance to the public.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19861 (the
Code) imported the judicial doctrine of economic substance into
statutory language, with some changes.2 Under this long-standing
doctrine, the courts can disallow a tax benefit that is contrary to
Congressional intent, even if all of the statutory and regulatory
requirements for claiming the benefit are met.3
Section 7701(o) is thus a set of legislative rules about the
content of a substantive judicial doctrine, and it gives the agency
(for the first time) the ability to issue guidance governing the
application of this doctrine.4 This Article addresses section
7701(o)’s unintended impact on the IRS, and certain other consequences of the codification (placement into the Internal Revenue Code) of the economic substance doctrine.
First, the Article discusses the IRS’s response to section
7701(o): codification seems to have inadvertently deterred the IRS
from raising economic substance issues, which in turn prevents
such issues from reaching the courts.5 This deterrence is especially
ironic because it follows government successes in using the doctrine in court,6 and because section 7701(o) gives the IRS, for the
I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012).
Id. § 7701(o). See generally Rebecca Rosenberg, Codification of the Economic
Substance Doctrine: Substantive Impact and Unintended Consequences, 15
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3158795 (discussing changes that section 7701(o) made to the economic substance doctrine).
3 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Bank of N.Y. Mellon
Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 107, 125 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom.
136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016) (citing Gregory to show that the doctrine is aimed at discerning whether a claimed tax benefit is consistent with Congressional intent).
See generally Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 5 (2000) (discussing the history of the economic substance doctrine).
4 See § 7701(o).
5 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011);
see also Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Repeal of the Economic Substance Statute, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 21, 2012, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/tax-system
-administration-issues/news-analysis-irs-repeal-economic-substance-statute
/2012/02/20/qq00.
6 See, e.g., Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 26
(1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017); Bank of
N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 107; Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d
1
2
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first time, the ability to affect the content of the economic substance
doctrine by means of guidance.7 Yet codification has instead
resulted in IRS reluctance to apply the doctrine.8 This is apparently because the IRS is averse to applying the penalties that were
enacted with codification and that are now mandatory when lack
of economic substance causes a tax deficiency.9
Among other things, this situation clearly raises issues about
the parameters of an agency’s discretion to decline to apply a
statute. In this case, such non-application contradicts Congress’s
clear intent to make the economic substance doctrine more effective.10 This Article discusses those issues and also considers
whether an agency’s authority to disregard a statute differs (practically speaking) when the agency’s action favors (rather than
disadvantages) taxpayers. If no one is likely to object to agency
action, are there any limits to agency authority?
In addition, the IRS has used informal communication to
issue de facto guidance regarding the economic substance statute,
in two different contexts. First, the IRS has expressed its aversion
to applying the economic substance doctrine by issuing written
instructions that impose heavy requirements for IRS employees
to meet before they can raise the doctrine.11 Those written instructions are available to the public.12 Secondly, the IRS has
932, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016); Wells Fargo &
Co. v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1142 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal
docketed, No. 17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017). These cases are
collectively referred to as the STARS cases.
7 See §§ 7701(o), 7805(a) (2012).
8 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15,
2011). See generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Case Against a Strict Liability Economic Substance Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 445, 466–67 (2011).
9 See §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
10 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443(I), at 295 (2010).
11 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15,
2011). This directive only applies to the Large Business and International (LB&I)
division of the IRS.
12 See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989).
These IRS instructions to IRS employees are easily available online. See, e.g.,
Heather C. Maloy, Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties, A.B.A. (July 15, 2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq-fall11-dillon
-irs-guidance-paper.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXK8-PFRK].
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issued a notice stating that it will continue to follow pre-codification
descriptions of the two prongs of the economic substance doctrine until further guidance is issued.13 That may not be a valid
interpretation of the statute.14 These letters and the notice (and
an additional notice on section 7701(o))15 are relied on by taxpayers,
and are treated by practitioners as if they were binding agency
guidance.16 But these communications are issued without formal
notice and comment procedures and with very limited public input.17 These uses of informal communication to implement policy
decisions about non-enforcement and about substantive interpretation raise issues about when informal guidance is appropriate.18
Codification also pushes the IRS and the courts to use other
anti-abuse doctrines instead of economic substance (in order to
avoid the penalties now associated with the economic substance
doctrine).19 In turn, this puts new pressure on distinguishing between the various anti-abuse doctrines, which tend to overlap.20
Previously, there was little need to carefully differentiate between them, but that has now changed.21
I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
See Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 25).
15 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
16 See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Economic Substance Notice’s Sham Treatment
Reverses LB&I Course, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 20, 2014, https://www.tax
notes.com/tax-notes-today/penalties/economic-substance-notices-sham-treatment
-reverses-lbi-course/2014/10/20/fly5 (reporting that practitioners treated Notice
2014-58 as if it reversed actual guidance created by the second directive, and
as if that directive had previously provided rules that taxpayers could rely on:
“Practitioners are ... faulting the notice for its reversal of course on a prior
IRS directive that exempted the sham transaction doctrine from being considered a ‘similar rule of law.’ ... [P]ractitioners ... had found relief in a 2011 Large
Business and International Division directive ... that exempted the sham transaction doctrine from similar application”) (emphasis added).
17 See Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and
Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 547–51 (2012) (discussing ways
the IRS issues informal guidance).
18 See id. at 552.
19 See infra Section III.B.1.a; see also Erik M. Jensen, Legislative and Regulatory Responses to Tax Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives, 57 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1, 31 (2012) (noting the IRS’s and courts’ power to use
other anti-abuse doctrines).
20 See infra Section III.B.1.b; see also Jensen, supra note 19, at 22–23.
21 See infra Section III.B.1.b; see also Jensen, supra note 19, at 24–25.
13
14

2018]

ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE

205

Lastly, there is an issue as to whether codification ends
questions about the validity of the economic substance doctrine.
Such invalidity assertions have been based either on arguments
that the doctrine is an incorrect interpretation of historic case law22
or on separation of powers concerns.23 This Article argues that
codification puts to rest the former type of validity argument, but
not the latter.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Description of Pre-Codification Economic Substance
Doctrine
The economic substance doctrine is a long-standing, courtcreated doctrine that essentially provides that tax benefits claimed
under a provision of the Internal Revenue Code will not be respected if they violate the intent of that provision, even if the
taxpayer meets all of the literal Code and regulatory requirements
for claiming such benefit.24 In other words, the doctrine allows
the courts to override the literal words of the Code and regulations, in favor of Congressional intent.25 If a transaction is found
to lack economic substance, then all tax results of that transaction—
the claimed tax benefit, income, deductions, etc.—are disregarded
See infra note 320 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Coltec Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 752 (2004) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court in Gregory did not intend to create the economic substance doctrine as currently implemented), vacated and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
23 Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3 n.6).
24 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (Mar. 5, 1997)
(the doctrine addresses “tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by means of transactions that serve no economic purpose other than tax savings”), aff’d, 157
F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), and cert denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999). This description of
the economic substance doctrine was cited, apparently with approval, by the
House Report that accompanied section 7701(o); see H.R. REP. NO. 111-443(I),
at 292 (2010); see also, e.g., Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he sham transaction doctrine seeks to identify a certain type of transaction that Congress presumptively would not have intended to accord beneficial tax treatment.”).
25 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Bank of N.Y.
Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2015); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 111-443(I), at 292–93; Joseph Bankman, supra note 3, at 8 n.4. (discussing
the application of the doctrine).
22
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for federal tax purposes, as if the transaction had never occurred.26
However, if part of the challenged transaction is found to be separable, and passes the economic substance test, such separable part
(and its associated tax benefits) can be respected.27
Judicial application of the economic substance doctrine, in
hundreds of cases, generally involves examination of whether the
challenged transaction was reasonably expected to generate a
profit (or to otherwise have an economic effect), and also whether
the taxpayer was subjectively motivated by more than just tax benefits.28 In this two-step analysis, the inquiry regarding profit and
economic effects is often called the objective prong.29 The subjective inquiry is often referred to as the business purpose prong or
subjective analysis.30
Different circuits describe their application of the economic
substance doctrine in various ways.31 Some circuits apply a conjunctive test, requiring that the taxpayer pass both the objective
and subjective prongs before the transaction can be respected as
26 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 113; Compaq Computer
Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); Alessandra v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2768, 2771 (June 1, 1995). Arguments to the contrary were recently
rejected by trial courts in the context of summary judgment motions in the
Santander and Wells Fargo cases, respectively. See Santander Holdings USA,
Inc. v. United States, 2018 WL 3448243 (D. Mass. July 17, 2018), summary
judgement denied after remand, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2016) (“A transaction’s
lack of economic substance is broadly fatal to tax benefits that arise only because
of the condemned contrivance.”); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2017 WL
4083148 (D. Minn. Sept. 15, 2017). See generally Amanda Athanasiou, No Summary Judgment for Santander in STARS Case, TAX NOTES INT’L (July 23, 2018).
27 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 124 (holding that a loan
was separable from a related transaction that was an economic sham and finding
that interest deductions therefore were allowable); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United
States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1146–47 (D. Minn. 2017).
28 See Bankman, supra note 3, at 12.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 27.
31 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443(I), at 293 (2010) (describing the differing approaches taken by various circuits); Jensen, supra note 19, at 26 (noting that circuits diverge on whether to apply the prongs conjunctively or not). See generally
Amanda L. Yoder, Note, One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs: A Look into the
Economic Substance Doctrine, 75 MO. L. REV. 1409, 1419–24 (2010) (describing in
detail each circuit’s application of the doctrine).
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having economic substance.32 Other circuits apply a disjunctive
test, under which taxpayers only need to meet one prong—either
the objective or the subjective analysis—in order to prevail on the
challenged tax benefits.33 Still other circuits use a more flexible
analysis, which considers the transaction’s tax and non-tax aspects, including the taxpayer’s subjective purpose and whether the
taxpayer had a reasonable expectation that the transaction would
result in either profit or other economic effects.34
Regardless of which type of description they use, almost all
courts that apply the economic substance test have actually analyzed both the objective and subjective prongs described above. 35
This occurs even in disjunctive-test circuits, where the taxpayer
technically only needs to win one prong to prevail, and in conjunctive-test circuits, where the taxpayer’s loss of only one prong
should technically prevent the tax benefit from being respected.36
Almost always, the courts have reached the same conclusion
on both prongs (finding that the transaction either meets both
the objective and subjective tests, or fails both such analyses).37
See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 115; Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009); Pasternak
v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993).
33 See, e.g., Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91–92 (4th Cir. 1985).
34 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. C.I.R., 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); Sacks v.
Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 1985).
35 See generally Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140,
1144–45 (D. Minn. 2017); see also generally Rosenberg, supra note 2.
36 See, e.g., IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 355 (8th Cir.
2001). Similarly, the First Circuit in Santander examined subjective motives,
even though the opinion said that the circuit prefers to examine only objective
aspects of the test. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844
F.3d 15, 15, 24 (1st Cir 2016), cert denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017).
But see Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 992 (1987) (declining to reach a finding
on the taxpayer’s subjective motives after finding that there was no reasonable
possibility of profit).
37 See, e.g., IES Industries, 253 F.3d at 353–54 (stating that the Eighth Circuit
has never had to decide which version of the test it uses because it always
decides both prongs the same way—yes to both or no to both); Wells Fargo &
Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (noting that, because the various formulations of the
economic substance test yield the same result for many fact patterns, some
circuits may not have needed to choose between the conjunctive, disjunctive,
and flexible analyses); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States., 143 F. Supp. 3d
32
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Therefore, the disjunctive, conjunctive, and flexible versions of the
test almost always reach the same result.38 In addition, the objective prong (the profit and economic effect analysis) tends to be
emphasized, and the business purpose prong (subjective analysis
of the taxpayer’s motivation) is almost never determinative, regardless of the type of economic substance test the court applies.39
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted section 7701(o),
as described below.40 It decreases variation among the circuits’
descriptions of the economic substance test by requiring a conjunctive test.41
B. Brief Overview of Section 7701(o)
Section 7701(o) provides that “if the economic substance
doctrine is relevant [to a transaction], such transaction shall be
treated as having economic substance only if ” it satisfies both an objective and a subjective prong.42 Thus, the disjunctive version of
the economic substance test is no longer allowed, and all circuits
827, 834 (D. Minn. 2015) (giving a similar description of the Eighth Circuit’s
precedents). Another court said that the litigants were unable to cite any case
in which a court held in the taxpayer’s favor on one prong and against the taxpayer on the other. Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 144 F. Supp.
3d 239, 244 (D. Mass. 2015), rev’d, 844 F.3d 15, 26 (1st Cir. 2016). In a recent, rare
exception, a jury held that a loan had objective profit potential but lacked
business purpose. See Wells Fargo & Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1142–43; see also
Wesley Elmore, Jury Sides with Government in Wells Fargo STARS Case,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 18, 2016, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-inter
national/litigation-and-appeals/jury-sides-government-wells-fargo-stars-case
/2016/11/21/svb5?highlight=Jury%20Sides%20with%20Government%20in%20
Wells%20Fargo%20STARS%20Case; Cara Salvatore, Jury Sides with Feds in
Wells Fargo $76M Tax Credit Suit, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www
.law360.com/articles/864145/jury-sides-with-feds-in-wells-fargo-76m-tax-credit
-suit. The court subsequently held that, given those findings, the loan met the
economic substance test when the court applied the flexible version of that
test. See Wells Fargo & Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146.
38 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
39 Wells Fargo & Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. See generally Rosenberg, supra
note 2 (discussing the pre-codification overlap between the objective and subjective prongs, as actually applied by the courts).
40 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (2010) (adding I.R.C. § 7701(o) to the Code).
41 Id. at 124 Stat. 1068.
42 I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2012). Relevance is left to the courts to determine. Id.
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must apply both prongs of the test. (A flexible version of the economic substance analysis may still be permissible under section
7701(o), if taxpayers must satisfy both the objective and the subjective analyses in order to meet such flexible test.)43
Section 7701(o)’s version of the objective prong requires that
“the transaction change[] in a meaningful way ... the taxpayer’s
economic position.”44 Its description of the subjective prong is met
if “the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.”45 The statute also imposes a ratio requirement regarding profit potential: the
“potential for profit … shall be taken into account [for both prongs]
only if the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit is substantial in relation to … expected net tax benefits.”46
For individuals, section 7701(o) applies only to “transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an
activity engaged in for the production of income.”47 Other transactions of individuals remain subject to the economic substance
case law (including pre-codification cases), but are not covered by
section 7701(o).
Several new penalty provisions relating to the economic substance doctrine were enacted concurrently with section 7701(o).48
Under these penalty rules, tax deficiencies attributable to the economic substance doctrine (as described in section 7701(o)) are subject to a twenty percent penalty49 (which rises to forty percent if
the facts regarding the claimed tax benefit are not adequately
disclosed on a tax return).50 Tax deficiencies relating to any “similar
43 See Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 7) (noting the conjunctive test
mandated by section 7701(o) does not prevent consideration of other factors in
addition to the objective and subjective prongs).
44 § 7701(o)(1)(A).
45 Id. § 7701(o)(1)(B).
46 Id. § 7701(o)(2)(A). This Article refers to such rule as the “ratio test” or “profit
ratio test.” Section 7701(o) also requires the Treasury to issue regulations that
treat foreign taxes as expenses in computing pre-tax profit “in appropriate
cases.” Id. § 7701(o)(2)(B).
47 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(B).
48 See §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
49 See § 6662(b)(6) (applying section 6662(a)’s penalty to tax deficiencies
attributable to the economic substance doctrine or similar doctrines).
50 See id. § 6662(i)(1)–(2) (regarding failure to adequately disclose on the
tax return or a statement attached thereto). For a critique of the new penalty
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rules of law” are subject to the same penalty rules.51 Such penalties (relating to the economic substance doctrine or any similar
rules of law) cannot be avoided by means of reasonable cause, 52
such as reliance on a tax advisor’s opinion.53
Because of codification, the Treasury is now able to issue
regulations and other guidance regarding the economic substance
doctrine. Such ability stems from Treasury’s generic authority to
issue guidance with respect to all Code provisions.54 The only
specific grant of regulatory authority regarding the economic
substance doctrine is Congress’s mandate that the Treasury issue
guidance regarding the treatment of foreign taxes in the computation of pre-tax profit.55 One exception to the Treasury’s regulatory
abilities in this area is the question of whether the economic substance doctrine is “relevant” with respect to any particular transaction. That issue remains the exclusive province of the courts.56
Therefore, the economic substance doctrine is now governed
partly by statutory terms, partly by case law, and partly (if it
chooses to issue guidance) by the agency. Under section 7701(o),
Congress has mandated some of the rules applicable under the
economic substance doctrine (e.g., the profit ratio test).57 But other
aspects of the doctrine remain open to interpretation by the courts
provisions, arguing that such increased penalties are unfair, overly harsh,
and unnecessary, see Thomas, supra note 8, at 465–67.
51 See id. § 6662(b)(6).
52 See id. § 6662(b)(6); § 6664(d)(1)–(2) (2015); see also § 6676 (2018) (regarding
lack of a reasonable basis exception for penalties with respect to excessive
amounts attributable to the economic substance doctrine or any similar doctrine).
53 The Joint Committee on Taxation’s description of these penalties includes
the following language:
No exceptions (including the reasonable cause rules) to the
penalty are available. Thus, under the provision, outside opinions
or in-house analysis would not protect a taxpayer from imposition
of a penalty if it is determined that the transaction lacks economic
substance or fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule
of law.
STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010, AS AMENDED,
IN COMBINATION WITH THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
JCX-18-10 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. REP.].
54 § 7805(a) (2012).
55 § 7701(o)(2)(B) (2012).
56 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
57 Id. § 7701(o)(2)(A).
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(including the meaning of undefined statutory terms, such as
“substantial”) and by the Treasury (through its regulatory authority).58 The preliminary question of relevance is left to the
courts,59 as are any other aspects of the doctrine that are neither
constrained by statutory language nor addressed by agency guidance. The standards and terms contained in section 7701(o)
should increase the various circuits’ consistency with each other
as they apply the economic substance doctrine in the future.
However, each circuit is still able to use its own interpretation of
terms that the statute leaves undefined, at least until the Treasury
issues guidance.60
One of section 7701(o)’s biggest impacts on the judicial
doctrine of economic substance is the changed balance of power
it creates between the courts and the agency on this topic.61 After codification, the IRS has the ability to impose modifications to
the economic substance doctrine (except with respect to the preliminary question of relevance).62 However, despite this new ability
to affect the doctrine and despite recent government victories on
economic substance issues (under pre-codification case law),63 the
IRS has shown reluctance to apply the post-codification version
of the economic substance doctrine.64 The discussion below considers how and why the IRS has communicated this decision, as
well as the appropriateness of the use of informal guidance to make
such policy choices.65
See §§ 7805(a) (general regulatory authority), § 7701(o)(1)(B) (“substantial”), (2)(A) (“substantial” as part of the ratio test). See generally Rosenberg,
supra note 2 (discussing the substantive provisions of section 7701(o)).
59 §§ 7701(o)(1), (5)(C).
60 See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(I), at 293 (2010) (describing various circuit’s
interpretations of the economic substance doctrine before codification); Erik
M. Jensen, Sometimes Unguided (or Maybe Misguided) Economic Substance
Guidance, 32 J. TAX’N INV. 27, 39 (2015) (The conjunctive test “requirement
might not provide for complete consistency among circuit courts, but it is a step
in the right direction.”).
61 § 7701(o).
62 Id. § 7701(o)(1), (5)(C).
63 See generally Rebecca Rosenberg, STARS Wars: Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine to Foreign Tax Credits, and What the Future Holds, 42
U. DAYTON L. REV. 165 (2017).
64 See generally id.
65 See infra Part II.
58

212 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:199
II. AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE: INFORMAL
TREASURY GUIDANCE UNDER SECTION 7701(O)
A. Overview
So far, the Treasury has issued two notices (and no other
official guidance) to the public regarding section 7701(o).66 The
first notice states (among other things) that the IRS will continue to apply pre-7701(o) case law to interpret section 7701(o), but
it declines to give the much-requested guidance on “relevance.”67
The second notice expands (not very helpfully) on the definition
of the tested “transaction,” and drastically cuts back on the potential application of penalties.68 The IRS has also issued two
letters to its own employees regarding section 7701(o).69 All four
documents are largely taxpayer-favorable.70 None was issued under notice and comment procedures.71 These notices and letters,
and the substantive and authority issues that they raise, are
discussed further below.72
B. Two IRS Notices on Economic Substance After Codification
The two IRS notices regarding section 7701(o) purport to
provide “guidance” with respect to such Code section, and both
apply to transactions that occur after March 30, 2010 (which is
also section 7701(o)’s effective date).73 Notices are a lesser type
66 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
67 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
68 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
69 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011);
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter collectively “the directives” or “the IRS directives”].
70 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Treas.
Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024,
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
71 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S.
Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024,
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
72 See discussion infra Section II.B.
73 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
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of “guidance” (as compared to regulations)74: they are not subject to
the notification and comment procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).75 One could therefore question whether it
is appropriate to use notices to provide rules that are binding on
taxpayers. Notices are often used to predict that the IRS will issue
regulations in the future, that such regulations will have content
described in the notice, and (sometimes) that the regulations’ effective date will be the notice’s effective date (or soon thereafter).76
Other notices purport to themselves issue enforceable rules.77 One
74

See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 671 (Ct. Cl.
2008) (“As a general proposition, IRS notices are press releases stating the IRS’s
position on a particular issue and informing the public of its intentions; such
notices do not constitute legal authority.... IRS notices are not promulgated
pursuant to a notice-and-comment period, the process which gives regulations their legal authority and entitles them to Chevron deference.”) (citation
omitted), aff’d, 608 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Pritired 1, L.L.C. v. United
States, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693, 728 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (reasoning that “A notice is
akin to a ‘revenue ruling’ and is an interpretation of the law offered by the
IRS. While not binding precedent, revenue rulings—and notices—are entitled
to ‘some weight,’ because the IRS ‘consider[s] them authoritative and binding.’”) (Citations omitted); In re Wyly, 552 B.R. 338 (U.S. B.R. N.D. TX 2016)
(“This notice is not entitled to deference under Chevron. This is because the
IRS Notice has not gone through the notice and comment rulemaking process. However, this notice has persuasive weight under Skidmore.”); cf. also
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“Revenue rulings receive the lowest degree of deference—at least in this circuit. In First Chicago, we held that revenue rulings deserve ‘some weight,’ ...
and are ‘entitled to respectful consideration, but not to the deference that the
Chevron doctrine requires in its domain,’... In other circuits this question has
generated inconsistent rulings ranging from Chevron deference to no deference.”) (citations omitted).
75 Treasury regulations, even interpretative regulations, are generally issued under notice and comment procedures. See generally Bankers Life, 142 F.3d
at 978 (stating that the IRS takes the position that notice and comment requirements do not apply to interpretative regulations issued under the general
regulatory authority of section 7805, but that the IRS nonetheless generally
follows such procedures for such regulations; notice and comment procedures
are not followed for revenue rulings, which the IRS views as binding and at
least some courts see as deserving some level of deference as the agency’s
interpretation).
76 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2014-45, 2014-34 I.R.B. 388 (Aug. 18, 2014); I.R.S.
Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746–47 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 98-5,
1998-3 C.B. 52 (Jan. 20, 1998) (withdrawn).
77 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 90-26, 1990-1 C.B. 336 (Jan. 1990) (purporting to
withdraw a portion of Temp. Reg. § 1.905-3T (Nov. 7, 2007)); I.R.S. Notice 8935, 1989-1 C.B. 675 (Jan. 1989) (purporting to modify Treas. Reg. § 163-8T).
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could legitimately question whether notices (as an administrative
vehicle) are legally capable of issuing rules that are binding on taxpayers, without the issuance of regulations that set forth those
same rules.78 In other words, one could debate whether notices
can substitute for regulations, revenue rulings, or revenue procedures, rather than merely forecasting the future issuance of such
formal types of guidance.
Notice 2010-62 says that “[t]he IRS will continue to rely
on relevant case law under the common-law economic substance
doctrine in applying the two-prong conjunctive test in section
7701(o)(1).”79 It does not specify that it refers to pre-7701(o) case
law, and presumably instead means the economic substance case
law as it evolves over time. But at the moment, more than eight
years after codification and after the notice’s issuance, there is
no post-codification case law that interprets section 7701(o). The
notice thus states the IRS’s intention to use pre-section 7701(o)
case law to interpret section 7701(o)’s requirements,80 which is
logically a little odd (unless one assumes that section 7701(o) merely
summarized the existing conjunctive-test case law).
The notice further states, more specifically, that it will use
case law relating to the objective and subjective prongs, respectively, to interpret the two prongs described in section 7701(o).81
On the one hand, this defers to the judiciary and declines to give
any guidance on the meaning of the statute’s two prongs. On the
other hand, it equates the two prongs described in the statute
with the two prongs previously applied in the pre-codification
case law (because there is no post-codification economic substance
case law yet). This seems to overlook the differences between section 7701(o)’s versions of the two prongs and the pre-enactment
versions of the two prongs, as they appear in pre-codification
case law. (For example, it does not address the statute’s implication that the objective and subjective prongs cannot now be identical to each other. Nor does it address differences between section
Cf. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978 (discussing the issuance of
regulations and the lower weight given to lesser types of authority, like revenue rulings).
79 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
80 See id.
81 Id.
78
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7701(o)’s phrasing of the two prongs and the usual description of
such prongs in pre-7701(o) case law.)82
Taxpayers may argue that the notice83 means that section
7701(o) should be read as not changing the pre-enactment versions of the objective and subjective factors (i.e., as exercising
the IRS’s regulatory authority to provide such an interpretation
of section 7701(o)). Such a choice by the IRS in Notice 2010-62
appears to be inadvertent, is arguably more than a mere notice
could accomplish, and could potentially be subject to a validity
challenge on the grounds that it conflicts with the statute.84 These
points may become moot in the future, if and when the courts begin
to interpret post-codification economic substance doctrine (thus
removing the issue of whether IRS reliance on pre-codification
judicial interpretations is valid). The notice also says that the IRS
will apply a conjunctive test for the economic substance analysis,
and will challenge any taxpayer effort to apply the disjunctive
test85 (which is consistent with section 7701(o), although it means
(for now) pre-codification versions of the conjunctive test).
The notice further acknowledges that “relevance” of the
economic substance doctrine (i.e., whether the economic substance
doctrine can be applied to a transaction) is left to the courts. 86
The relevance issue is specifically reserved to the courts by the
statute, which states that relevance determination “shall be made
in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.”87
Consistent with this reservation of the relevance issue to the
courts, the notice states that the IRS will continue to analyze
relevance by examining the case law, just as it did before codification.88 The notice also acknowledges that the IRS expects the
See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2 (describing changes that section
7701(o) makes to the economic substance doctrine).
83 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
84 However, as discussed further below, taxpayers are unlikely to challenge
any IRS guidance that is taxpayer-favorable. See infra notes 202–03 and text
accompanying.
85 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
86 See id.; see also I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (2012). The issue of whether the doctrine applies is merely the gateway question of whether the IRS or the courts
should complete the economic substance analysis. Even if the analysis is conducted, the transaction might still meet—or instead fail—the economic substance
test. See id. § 7701(o)(1).
87 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
88 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
82
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case law regarding relevance to “continue to develop.”89 Lastly,
the notice confirms that “the Treasury Department and the IRS
do not intend to issue general administrative guidance regarding
the types of transactions to which the economic substance doctrine either does or does not apply.”90
Taxpayers have asked the IRS to issue guidance on when the
economic substance doctrine is relevant.91 Sometimes taxpayers
have requested either a list of transactions to which the economic substance doctrine does apply, or (instead) an “angel list” or
“white list” of transactions to which the doctrine never applies.92
The IRS’s decision not to issue guidance on relevance is contrary
to taxpayer requests, but is consistent with the Treasury’s lack
of regulatory authority on this issue.93
Id.
Id. at 412.
91 See, e.g., Michael J. Desmond et al., Firms Seek Codified Economic Substance Doctrine Guidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 2015, https://www.taxnotes
.com/tax-notes-today/penalties/firms-seek-codified-economic-substance-doctrine
-guidance/2015/02/04/fq0y?highlight=Desmond (“[W]e recommend that Treasury
and the IRS issue substantive guidance on which taxpayers and practitioners
can rely regarding whether the economic substance doctrine is ‘relevant’ to a
transaction.”); see also Peter H. Blessing, NYSBA Tax Section Recommends
More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Jan. 5, 2011, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/corporate
-taxation/nysba-tax-section-recommends-more-guidance-codification-economic
-substance-doctrine/2011/01/07/vq8c (asking the IRS to “enunciate a few principles identifying broad categories of transactions to which the [doctrine] is
not ‘relevant’”).
92 See, e.g., Blessing, supra note 91, at 7.
93 Notice 2010-62 further states that the IRS will not issue private letter
rulings or determination letters regarding either relevance or whether a particular transaction meets the economic substance test. I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40
I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). Later, in Notice 2014-58, the IRS said that “[w]hether the
economic substance doctrine is relevant ... will be considered on a case-bycase basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.”
I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). Because the IRS has
admitted that it does not have regulatory authority to provide guidance on relevance, the quoted language presumably refers to the IRS’s analysis of whether it
can raise economic substance as an issue (e.g., at the audit level or in litigation), not whether it should issue binding guidance. Id. A court would then be
free to disagree with the IRS’s determination of whether the economic substance
doctrine applied to a particular transaction or not (i.e., whether a particular type
of tax benefit was exempt from the doctrine).
89
90
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On a different issue, Notice 2010-62 also states that the
IRS and the Treasury “intend to issue regulations” regarding the
circumstances in which foreign taxes are treated as a cost in computing profit (for purposes of applying the economic substance
doctrine).94 Such issuance would comply with section 7701(o)’s
mandate that the Treasury issue guidance on this topic.95 Despite
the notice’s 2010 statement, no agency guidance has yet been issued
on this subject.
Section 7701(o) provides that profit potential is taken into
account for the two prongs of the economic substance analysis
only if reasonably expected profit is substantial as compared to
expected tax benefits (determined as if the transaction were respected).96 Notice 2010-62 says that the IRS plans to follow this
rule.97 However, it describes the rule as relating to whether
“profit motive” is taken into account, rather than “potential for
profit.”98 The use of the word “motive” is puzzling, but the IRS does
not appear to mean that the ratio test applies only for purposes
of determining subjective intent. (Nor would such an interpretation
necessarily be a valid reading of the statute.) The IRS applies its
“profit motive” limitation to both prongs (“[i]n determining whether
the requirements of section 7701(o)(1)(A) and (B) are met”), which
implies that “profit motive” may be intended to mean “reasonably
expected profit.”99
I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B) (2012).
96 See id. § 7701(o)(2)(A).
97 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
98 Compare id. with § 7701(o)(2)(A).
99 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). In addition, the
IRS “will apply existing relevant case law and other published guidance” to
implement the ratio test, according to the notice. It is not clear what this
“existing ... guidance” might be (other than the two notices themselves), given
that there is no other published administrative guidance to date (other than
the internal IRS letters, discussed below) and no court case has yet interpreted
section 7701(o)’s ratio test. The phrasing of the ratio test described in the statute
(e.g., the use of the word “substantial”) differs from the pre-codification case
law’s comparisons of expected profit and expected tax benefits, although it
resembles the wording of (withdrawn) Notice 98-5 (which predicted the issuance of certain regulations regarding foreign tax credits). See § 7701(o)(2)(A);
I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-3 C.B. 49 (Jan. 20, 1998) (withdrawn); Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1960) (holding that expected profit that was “a
relative pittance” was not enough); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d
94
95
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The notice also provides further guidance on how to meet
the disclosure requirements of some of the amendments that
accompanied section 7701(o).100 In addition, it states that the
IRS is particularly interested in taxpayer comments regarding
such disclosure mechanics.101
Issued four years later, Notice 2014-58 focuses on the definition of the “transaction” to be tested under the economic substance doctrine and the interpretation of “similar rule of law” (which
is relevant for the penalty provisions enacted concurrently with
section 7701(o)).102
Regarding the delineation of the tested transaction, Notice 2014-58 does not add much.103 It essentially says that the
tested transaction is determined based on the facts and circumstances. It adds that the primary consideration is whether particular steps were “tax-motivated steps that are not necessary to
accomplish the non-tax goals.”104 These types of steps “may” be
treated as one transaction, with remaining steps tested separately (as a different transaction).105
The notice begins by providing a default definition of a
testable transaction. A “‘transaction’ generally includes all the
932, 951, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016) (finding that
profit “grossly disproportionate to the tax benefits” was not enough); WFC
Holdings Corp. v. U.S., 728 F.3d 736, 746 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that “modest profits” compared to “substantial tax benefits” were insufficient) (citation
omitted); Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 767–68 (1990) (finding that profit
that was “infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when considered in
comparison with the claimed deductions” was not sufficient). See generally
Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing differences between the ratio test and precodification case law, and similarities between the ratio test and Notice 98-5).
100 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
101 See id.
102 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
103 Cf. Amy S. Elliott, IRS Ruling Was First Under New Significant Issue
Policy, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 17, 2014, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes
/corporate-taxation/irs-ruling-was-first-under-new-significant-issue-policy/2014
/10/20/qxcm (reporting on public comments by then–Associate Chief Counsel
(Corporate) William Alexander: Notice 2014-58 was “‘merely rearticulating what
the Service has said all along,’ he said. Sowell asked why the government felt the
need to issue the guidance now. Alexander said he didn’t know, reiterating that
he didn’t think the IRS said anything in the notice that it hadn’t said before”).
104 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
105 See id.
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factual elements relevant to the expected tax treatment ... and any
or all steps that are carried out as part of a plan.”106 The first
phrase of that definition is similar to the case law, although
“relevant to” the claimed tax benefit is a little broader than the
common case law formulation of steps “necessary” to achieve the
tax benefit.107 The second phrase quoted above (“any or all steps”)
seems to require a facts and circumstances analysis to define the
“plan,” but does not specifically state that “relev[ance] to the expected tax treatment” is the standard to be applied. The definition quoted above is adapted by the IRS from a regulation issued
in the “analogous context of reportable transactions.”108
The notice then says that the default rule described above
“may” be changed—and steps may be aggregated or disaggregated in order to determine the transaction to be tested—if there
is a “tax motivated step that is not necessary to achieve a nontax objective.”109 In that case, the tested transaction “may” consist only of such steps.110 This part of the IRS’s discussion is
phrased a little differently than some courts’ formulations: several courts have said that the tested transaction consists of the
steps necessary to claim the challenged tax benefit.111 The notice,
in contrast, says that steps that are both insufficiently connected
to non-tax utility (rather than those affirmatively necessary for
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 585 (Fed.
Cl. 2013) (“the links between the Trust and Loan components of STARS are
artificial, and further, ... the disputed foreign tax credits are attributable solely
to the Trust. Accordingly, the Court will bifurcate the STARS transaction and
examine the Trust structure for economic substance, independent of the Loan,”
although the court also analyzed the transaction without bifurcating the loan
and trust), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 786 F. 3d 932 (Fed Cir. 2015), and cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016); Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r,
801 F.3d 104, 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2015) (focusing on the transaction that generated the disputed tax benefit), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1377 (2016); ACM P’ship
v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 262 (3d Cir. 1998) (allowing deductions for losses
that were “separate and distinct” from the tax benefits that were the main
point of the challenged transaction), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
108 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014) (referring to
the definition of “transaction” in Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1), which relates to
disclosure requirements for reportable transactions described in section 6011).
109 Id.
110 See id.
111 See supra text accompanying note 107.
106
107
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a tax benefit, as described in the case law) and also “tax motivated” are separated from other steps of the taxpayer.112
The IRS’s language regarding whether various steps are
“necessary to achieve a non-tax objective” resembles the language
of the tax court in ACM v. Commissioner.113 That particular phrasing was part of that court’s description of the economic substance
test, but this wording is sometimes cited as a description of the subjective prong.114 (The ACM court did not apply either a conjunctive
or disjunctive format, but instead described the economic substance test as a more flexible analysis, including consideration of
both profit potential and subjective motive.)115 Notice 2014-58
essentially adapts the ACM court’s description of transactions that
meet the economic substance test (i.e., of what the economic substance test is seeking to determine, and what will allow a transaction to pass the test) and uses that phrasing to separate steps
that seem to have more business content from other, tax-benefitfocused steps.116 In other words, the notice uses the tax court’s
phrasing (or, more specifically, language that resembles such phrasing) for a different purpose than the tax court did.
Using the word “may”117 is consistent with the notice’s later
emphasis that “whether a transaction should be disaggregated will
This test appears to require that taxpayers meet only one of the two
stated criteria: steps meeting either the non-tax-motivated or necessary-to-a
non-tax-objective standards may be respected as part of a larger whole and not
re-characterized as separable from the rest of the transaction. Steps failing
only one of such two criteria do not appear to necessarily be treated as separable from the rest of the transaction. However, the notice qualifies its default
test by stating that facts and circumstances analyses may be applied. See I.R.S.
Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
113 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 22157 (Mar. 5, 1997)
(“Key to this determination is that the transaction must be rationally related
to a useful nontax purpose that is plausible in light of the taxpayer’s conduct
and useful in light of the taxpayer’s economic situation and intentions.”).
114 See, e.g., Compaq v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2001); Austin v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-69, 11 (2017); Salina Partnership L.P. v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-352, 13 (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 111-443 at 297 (2010).
115 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]hese distinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of
a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent related factors both of which
inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart
from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”).
116 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
117 If there is a “tax motivated step that is not necessary to achieve a non-tax
objective,” then the tested transaction “may” consist only of such steps. See id.
112
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be considered on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case.”118 The notice avoids giving clear, mechanical rules, opting instead for weighing and balancing of all of the facts and circumstances.119
Notice 2014-58 also addresses the meaning of “similar
rule of law.”120 That term is important because tax deficiencies
attributable to “similar rules of law” are subject to the same enhanced penalty provisions as tax deficiencies arising under section 7701(o).121 Notice 2014-58 states that no Code or regulatory
provision will be treated as such a “similar rule of law” (except section 7701(o) itself, and regulations issued thereunder). 122 That
leaves only judicial doctrines as potential “similar rules of law.”
The notice explains that a “similar rule of law” is one “that
applies the same factors and analysis” as section 7701(o),123 “even
if a different term” is used to describe such rule of law or doctrine.124
It lists “step transaction” and “substance over form” as doctrines
that are not “similar rules of law.”125 However, the notice gives
“sham transaction doctrine” as an example of such a “different
term.”126 This implies (without directly stating) that the sham
Id.
See id.
120 Id.
121 See I.R.C § 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
122 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct.27, 2014).
123 The notice adapts this terminology from the House Report’s description
of circumstances in which the enhanced penalties would apply. See H.R. REP.
NO. 111-443, at 304 (2010); Thomas C. Vanik, Jr., Torpedoing a Transaction:
Economic Substance Versus Other Doctrines and the Application of the Strict
Liability Penalty, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 109, 117 n.65 (2015) (pointing out that
this language in Notice 2014-58 mirrors language in the House Committee report: “The notice relied on the legislative history, which states that the ‘penalty
would apply to a transaction that is disregarded as a result of the application
of the same factors and analysis that is required under the provision [section
7701(o)] for an economic substance analysis, even if a different term is used
to describe the doctrine’”).
124 The notice also defines “similar rule of law” as meaning a doctrine that
disallows tax benefits because a transaction fails either the objective or subjective prong (as described in section 7701(o)). This is the equivalent of section
7701(o)’s conjunctive test, despite the use of the word “or” rather than “and”:
a transaction meets the economic substance test if it passes both prongs, and
fails the test if it fails either prong (i.e., if it fails the objective or the subjective prong). See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
125 Id.
126 Id.
118
119
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transaction doctrine is a “similar rule of law” for purposes of
section 6662(b)(6) and the other relevant penalty provisions.127
Despite that implication, the notice literally only treats
“sham transaction doctrine” as a “similar rule of law” if the IRS (or
a court) treats the sham transaction doctrine as applying “the
same factors and analysis” as section 7701(o).128 If a court used
the term “sham transaction doctrine” to mean a different theory
or analysis (as compared to economic substance), such application
by the court presumably would not be treated as a similar doctrine.129 For example, the case law has distinguished between
“factual shams” (in which the claimed steps did not actually occur)
and “economic shams” (in which the steps did occur, but did not
fall within Congressional intent for generating a particular type
of tax benefit).130 Thus, “sham transaction,” if used to refer to a
factual sham, might not be similar to the economic substance
doctrine. The whole point of the notice’s approach is that the
term used to describe a doctrine is not determinative—the question (for deciding if there is a “similar rule of law”) is whether
the factors and analysis described in section 7701(o) are used.131
There is an argument that any doctrine that uses the same
factors that are described in section 7701(o) would fall within
the definition of the “economic substance doctrine”132 in section
See id.
See id.
129 Cf. William R. Davis, Economic Substance Notice Not Intended to Implicate
All Shams, TAX NEWS TODAY, Feb. 2, 2015, https://www.taxnotes.com/taxpractice
/penalties/economic-substance-notice-not-intended-implicate-all-shams/2015/02
/02/1s831?highlight=%29%20Economic%20Substance%20Notice%20Not%20In
tended%20to%20Implicate%20All%20Shams%20Economic%20Substance%20
Notice%20Not%20Intended%20to%20Implicate%20All%20Shams (describing
public comments by Treasury official (Tax Legislative Counsel), Thomas West,
who said that the notice does not mean that the sham transaction doctrine
will always be treated as a similar doctrine to economic substance, and that
he was surprised that practitioners read the notice that way, without giving a
detailed explanation of what exactly the notice’s wording does mean).
130 See infra note 310 and accompanying text.
131 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
132 See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (2012) (defining the economic substance doctrine
as “the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A ... are not
allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business
purpose”). For example, the disjunctive test falls within the statute’s definition of
the economic substance doctrine. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-43, at 297 n.128. If a court
127
128
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7701(o). If that is the case, the notice effectively states that no
judicial doctrine (that was not already subject to section 7701(o)
and treated as the “economic substance doctrine” for purposes of
that section) would be treated as a “similar rule of law.” Because
the notice also excludes statutory and regulatory rules from being “similar rules of law” for this purpose,133 “similar rules of law”
would be a null set (other than section 7701(o) itself). Under that
interpretation, the notice has made “similar rule of law” moot
and meaningless. Query whether defining “similar rule of law”
as a null set is within, or instead beyond, Treasury’s regulatory
authority (on the grounds that such an interpretation may be inconsistent with the statute, and that interpretations that render
statutory language moot are generally disfavored).134
Alternatively, taxpayers might argue that no judicial antiabuse rules use the same factors as section 7701(o) because section 7701(o)’s descriptions of the two prongs differ from the case
law definitions.135 (They could cite, for example, the requirement
for “substantial” business purpose, as well as the profit ratio test
that applies for both prongs.)136 Such an argument also leads to
no doctrines being treated as “similar rules of law,” under the
notice’s rules. We can expect that the IRS and taxpayers may
vigorously debate the meaning of “same factors and analysis [as
section 7701(o)].”137
defined the sham transaction doctrine as having two prongs that are equivalent to section 7701(o)’s prongs, the so-defined sham transaction doctrine appears
to fall within section 7701(o)’s definition of the economic substance doctrine.
133 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
134 See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant”); Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two terms because
it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 577–78 (1995); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed”).
135 See § 7701(o); see also Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing differences
between section 7701(o) and the pre-codification case law).
136 See §§ 7701(o)(1)(B), (2)(A). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing new rules enacted by section 7701(o), as compared to pre-enactment
case law).
137 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
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The courts are not bound by the notice’s rule about similar
doctrines. That rule, by its terms, applies only to predict whether
the IRS will argue that a doctrine is a “similar rule of law.”138 The
notice does not provide authoritative guidance in the same way
as a regulation.139
The notice also narrows the potential range of arguments
that the IRS could treat as “similar rules of law” in another
manner: the notice states that no tax deficiency will be treated
as attributable to a “similar rule of law” unless the IRS also
raises section 7701(o).140 In other words, if the IRS does not assert section 7701(o), then it will not argue that any other authorities it relies on are “similar rules of law” for purposes of the
penalty provisions.141
The notice also narrows the potential range of arguments
that the IRS could treat as “similar rules of law” in another
manner: the notice states that no tax deficiency will be treated as
attributable to a “similar rule of law” unless the IRS also raises
section 7701(o).142 In other words, if the IRS does not assert section 7701(o), then it will not argue that any other authorities it
relies on are “similar rules of law” for purposes of the penalty
provisions.143 There appears to be a validity issue with respect to
that choice also, on the grounds that the IRS’s decision disregards
(and renders moot) the statutory requirement that the penalty
amendments enacted with section 7701(o) apply both to section
7701(o) and to “similar rules of law.”144 If the IRS will never
argue that there is a “similar rule of law” unless it raises section
7701(o), then the inclusion of “similar rules of law” in the penalty
provisions is meaningless (because the penalty never applies unless
section 7701(o) is raised, so the reference to the economic substance doctrine is sufficient, without more).145 Also query whether
See id.
See id.; Understanding IRS Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS (May 9, 2018),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://
perma.cc/R9MH-DVE6].
140 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See §§ 6662(b)(6), 6662(c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
145 Assume, however, that the IRS raised section 7701(o) in litigation with
respect to a particular transaction, and also asserted three other judicial antiabuse doctrines (other than economic substance). Further assume that the court
138
139
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a court could conclude that a tax deficiency is attributable to a
“similar rule of law” (triggering the same penalties that would
apply if section 7701(o) were the basis of a deficiency), even if
the IRS does not raise that argument.146
Viewed as a whole, the notice provides that the IRS will
not argue that a tax deficiency is attributable to a “similar rule of
law” for purposes of the penalty provisions unless a) such rule of
law is a judicial doctrine, b) that doctrine uses the same factors
and analysis as section 7701(o), and c) the IRS also raises section
7701(o).147 If one takes the notice at face value, one could say that
the required three factors considerably narrow the potential scope
of “similar rules of law” (possibly to zero), but also provide more
predictability for taxpayers regarding the application of the strict
liability penalties associated with economic substance issues.148
One could further note that the notice’s guidance on this topic appears to require a case-by-case analysis, rather than giving a list of
doctrines that always are or always are not “similar rules of law.”149
Looking at the IRS’s asserted three factors logically, however, the notice appears to be saying that there are no “similar
rules of law,” other than judicial doctrines that are identical to
(redundant with) section 7701(o) but are called by another name
and are raised where the IRS is already raising section 7701(o).
This makes no sense—the notice is literally saying that the IRS
will never assert that any doctrine is a “similar rule of law” unless
held for the government under one of those other three doctrines. In that case,
the IRS might treat such other doctrine as a similar rule of law (for purposes
of the penalty provisions), but only if such doctrine used the same factors and
analysis as section 7701(o). The step transaction doctrine, for example, is not
treated as a “similar” doctrine under Notice 2014-58. See I.R.S. Notice 201458, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). The IRS likely would not assess the
enhanced penalties for deficiencies relating to the step transaction doctrine
even though it had attempted to use the economic substance doctrine against
the same transaction. Theoretically, however, there might be another doctrine
that uses the same factors as section 7701(o), even if the relevant circuit refers
to that doctrine by another name, for example if the court refers to such other
rules as the “economic sham doctrine.” Is such a fact pattern sufficient to stop the
phrase “similar other doctrine” from becoming moot under the notice’s approach?
146 Presumably, the IRS could prevent such a conclusion by formally conceding (in a particular case) that its arguments are not “similar rules of law.”
147 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
148 See id.
149 See id.
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that doctrine is completely duplicative of the IRS’s other argument
(section 7701(o)) in the same case. This interpretation appears to
read the “similar rule of law” language out of the statutory framework and is arguably an instance of the agency publicly communicating that it will not implement language (“similar rule of
law”) enacted by Congress.
1. Two IRS Directives Discourage Agents from Raising
Economic Substance Issues
The IRS has also issued two directives to its own examiners
regarding section 7701(o) (the codified version of the economic
substance doctrine).150 The first directive, issued in 2010, was
addressed as “examination guidance” to employees of the former
Large and Mid-Sized Business (LMSB) Division.151 Its substantive
guidance consisted of one sentence: “To ensure consistent administration of the accuracy-related penalty imposed under section 6662(b)(6)” on tax deficiencies that occur by reason of the
economic substance doctrine or any similar rule of law, “any proposal to impose a section 6662(b)(6) penalty at the examination
level must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate Director of Field Operations before the penalty is proposed.”152
The IRS (at least the former LMSB Division) was thus focused on the penalties associated with the economic substance
doctrine (and imposed by reason of the penalty amendments that
accompanied section 7701(o)). The directive’s requirement that raising such penalties must first be approved by a Director of Field
Operations is clearly a barrier to asserting such penalties: it
imposes another procedural layer (which is a disincentive for IRS
examiners) and raises the possibility that the Field Director could
say no. Because the penalties are a mandatory consequence of any
tax deficiency attributable to section 7701(o) (or any similar rule
of law), the additional approval requirement presumably also dissuaded examiners from raising economic substance (and similar
See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011);
see also I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
151 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14,
2010).
152 See id.
150
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issues), not just the penalties. This IRS policy presumably reduces
the intended deterrent effect (and revenue-raising potential) of
the enhanced penalties that were enacted with section 7701(o).
The IRS later expanded its internal guidance on section
7701(o) by issuing another directive, this time addressed to the
newly formed Large Business and International (LB&I) Division.153 This second directive “instruct[ed] examiners and their
managers how to determine when it is appropriate to seek the
approval of the DFO (Director of Field Operations) in order to raise
the economic substance doctrine.”154 It also provided procedures
for the examiner to follow in order to seek such approval, which
included submitting a written analysis of thirty-five specified
factors.155 These paperwork requirements created hurdles that
must have been meant to (and likely did) dissuade examiners
from raising the economic substance doctrine.
The directive also provided that, “until further guidance is
issued,” no rule or doctrine would be treated as a “similar rule of
law” for purposes of penalty assertion.156 In particular, the sham
transaction doctrine, step transaction doctrine, and substance over
form doctrine would not be so treated.157 The agency (or part
thereof) appeared to be declining to implement particular statutory language (relating to penalty provisions enacted with respect
tax deficiencies attributable to “similar rules of law”).158 As described above, this part of the directive is now obsolete, because
further guidance has been issued: Notice 2014-58 defines “similar rule of law” (ruling out the step transaction and substance over
form doctrines, and including the sham transaction doctrine, but
only where the latter uses the same analysis as section 7701(o)
and the IRS raises section 7701(o)).159
The directive also states that generally “a series of interconnected steps with a common objective” is one “transaction” for
purposes of applying the economic substance doctrine.160 It “may
be appropriate” to treat as a separate transaction “tax-motivated
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
See id.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
159 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
160 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
153
154
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steps that bear only a minor or incidental relationship to a single common business or financial transaction.”161 But in order to
bifurcate steps “with a common objective,” an examiner “is required to seek guidance from their manager and consult with their
local counsel.”162
The directive requires an examiner to complete four steps
before seeking approval to raise the economic substance doctrine.163
First, the examiner must consider a series of eighteen listed factors
that would indicate that it is “likely not appropriate” to raise the
doctrine.164 Those factors include whether the tax benefit at issue
is consistent with legislative intent.165 They also ask whether
the “[t]ransaction creates meaningful economic change on a present value basis (pre-tax)” and whether it “has credible business
purpose apart from federal tax benefits.”166 These two factors
resemble section 7701(o)’s two main requirements, except that the
directive does not ask if the business purpose is “substantial,” as
required by section 7701(o).167
The directive also specifically states that “it is likely not
appropriate” to assert the doctrine in four specific instances: the
choice between debt and equity, the choice of a foreign rather
than a U.S. entity to make a foreign investment, “[t]he choice to
enter into a ... corporate organization or reorganization under
subchapter C,” or “[t]he choice to utilize a related-party entity in
a transaction, provided that arm’s length standard of section 482
and other applicable concepts are satisfied.”168 These four instances
mirror the legislative history’s list of circumstances in which section 7701(o) is generally not expected to change the tax result.169
See id.
See id.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
167 See id.; see also I.R.C. § 7701 (2012).
168 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
169 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-43, at 296 (2010) (“The provision is not intended
to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under
longstanding judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely because
the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based
on comparative tax advantages.”); see also JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 53
(giving same four non-exclusive examples of basic business conduct for which
section 7701(o) was not intended to alter the tax treatment). Immediately
161
162
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Next, the examiner must consider a second list of seventeen factors that conversely indicate that the application of the
economic substance doctrine “may be appropriate.”170 These seventeen factors are generally just the reverse of each of the eighteen
factors described above (except for the factor regarding Congressional intent, which does not appear in the reverse in the second
list).171 It is not clear why both (mostly duplicative) lists are necessary, rather than one being sufficient.
This second list asks whether the “transaction has no credible business purpose,” again not examining whether such purpose
is “substantial.”172 Nor does either list of factors apply the profit
ratio test imposed by section 7701(o)(2)(A).173 It is particularly
striking that although section 7701(o) lists two factors (the objective and subjective prongs), the directive lists eighteen (if one
counts each of the duplicative factors only once).174 Under these
lists, merely failing the two prongs (as modified by the directive to
omit both the ratio test and the requirement that business purpose
be substantial) is not enough to show that the economic substance
doctrine should be raised as an issue (much less that the transaction lacks economic substance).175 Instead (before the economic
after the four examples, the House and Joint Committee Reports both state that
“[l]easing transactions, like all other types of transactions, will continue to be
analyzed in light of all the facts and circumstances.” H.R. REP. NO. 111-43, at
296; JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 53, at 153. It is not totally clear whether
this indicates that the four examples will not be examined in accordance with
all of their facts and circumstances (which seems an odd interpretation), or
whether instead the four examples are included within the “all other transactions” that (like leasing transactions) will be so examined. See H.R. REP. NO.
111-43, at 296. The latter interpretation is bolstered by the immediately following confirmation that “the fact that a transaction does meet the requirements
for specific treatment under any provision of the Code is not determinative of
whether a transaction or series of transactions of which it is a part has economic substance.” Id. Also, under section 7701(o), the issue of whether the doctrine applies (i.e., the type of transaction or tax benefit to which it applies) is
ultimately left to the courts. See § 7701(o)(5)(C).
170 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15,
2011) (emphasis added).
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See § 7701(o)(5)(A).
174 See § 7701(o)(1); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1,
20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
175 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
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substance doctrine can be raised), multiple other factors also need
to be taken into account (without any indication of relative weight),
and then the examiner must perform the additional two steps of the
process and the DFO must approve the assertion of the issue.176
Thirdly, the examiner must address a list of seven “inquir177
ies.”
Each inquiry describes circumstances in which the economic substance doctrine “should” not be applied (rather than definitively saying that it cannot be applied).178 In particular, inquiry
five says that the doctrine should not be applied if another judicial doctrine is more appropriate.179 In other words, the economic
substance doctrine should not be applied in addition to another
doctrine (if the other doctrine is more appropriate), even if the
economic substance doctrine is also a viable argument.180 This
appears aimed at preventing the use of the enhanced penalties
associated with economic substance. Inquiry seven asks whether
the economic substance doctrine is “among the strongest arguments available.”181 If not, the doctrine “should” not be applied
“without specific approval of the examiner’s manager in consultation with local counsel.”182
Lastly, after completion of the above steps, the examiner
must describe the above analysis in writing, “in consultation
with his or her manager and territory manager” in order to seek
DFO approval of raising economic substance arguments.183 That
written analysis is then submitted to the DFO, who should “consult with Counsel before a decision is made.”184
In addition, an examiner is required to notify the taxpayer
that the examiner is considering raising the economic substance
doctrine (as soon as possible, and not later than the time the
examiner begins the required pre-DFO-approval analysis of factors).185 Before granting approval to raise the economic substance
See id.
See id.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See id.
176
177
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doctrine, the DFO “should” give the taxpayer an opportunity to
respond in writing or in person.186
Neither of the above directives are irrevocable for the IRS
(which can change its mind at any time), nor may either directive technically be relied on by taxpayers.187 Each directive
states that it is “not an official pronouncement of law, and cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such.”188 However, because
such directives are publicly available and because they help predict the enforcement choices of the IRS, taxpayers treat them as
if they were official guidance.189 Further, the directives provide
mandatory guidance for IRS examiners and other IRS employees,
unless and until such directives are modified.190
The second directive requires an examiner to consider much
more than whether a transaction fails one of section 7701(o)’s
two prongs.191 One could argue that the directive effectively requires a variant of the flexible version of the economic substance
test, rather than the conjunctive (meeting two prongs is sufficient)
or disjunctive (meeting one prong is enough) test. The directive does
not specify how many factors must be met (or failed) before the
economic substance doctrine is raised (or before raising the economic substance argument is determined to be inappropriate).192
Presumably, examiners can also consider additional factors (as well as the eighteen listed in the directive), as long as
they consider the listed items. In other words, the lists are not
necessarily the exclusive factors, although the directive does not
address that point.193
See id.
See id.; see also I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5
(Sept. 14, 2010).
188 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011);
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
189 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 16 (reporting that practitioners treated Notice 2014-58 as if it reversed actual guidance created by the second directive,
and as if that directive had previously provided rules that taxpayers could rely
on: “Practitioners are ... faulting the notice for its reversal of course on a prior
IRS directive that exempted the sham transaction doctrine from being considered a ‘similar rule of law.’”) (emphasis added).
190 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011);
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
191 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
192 See id.
193 See id.
186
187
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All of the required analyses and consultation, followed by
written description of the analyses and seeking approval of the
examiner’s manager and DFO, create disincentives for examiners
to raise the economic substance doctrine.194
These numerous obstacles (many analyses, multiple approvals, and a written report of the analyses), before an LB&I examiner
is even allowed to assert the economic substance doctrine,195 raise
questions about the appropriate limits of an agency’s enforcement
discretion. If anyone had standing, could one argue that the IRS
has essentially chosen to almost never enforce section 7701(o),196
despite Congress’s clear statement (in section 7701(o)) that the
courts are the final determiners of whether the doctrine applies?197
Could one argue that such nonenforcement goes beyond the
agency’s authority? Or does the agency always have discretion not
to raise a judicial doctrine as a legal argument? Has codification
altered the extent of such allowable discretion? Might the IRS
argue that because the directives are not technically binding guidance, therefore such directives need not follow any rules that might
require an agency to more closely adhere to Congressional intent?
The second directive’s thirty-five factors (eighteen, if duplicative ones are disregarded) can also be read as creating standards for treating certain transactions as meeting the economic
substance test (in practice).198 A transaction for which the economic substance test is not raised is effectively treated as if it
meets the economic substance analysis.
Under the statute, transactions must meet at least the two
prongs in order to pass the economic substance analysis.199 But
See Sheppard, supra note 5 (arguing that the LB&I directive creates hurdles
that discourage IRS employees from raising the economic substance doctrine).
195 In contrast, Chief Counsel review (by an Associate office or the office of
the Taxpayer Advocate) is required for section 7701(o) cases only if the fact pattern is “novel.” See CC-2016-009 (June 30, 2016), Exhibit 35.11.1-1, Part II,
Procedure and Administration issue 22 (Chief Counsel Notice that preceded
expected changes to the Chief Counsel Directives Manual) (“The application of
the codified economic substance doctrine under section 7701(o) in novel cases.”).
196 See Sheppard, supra note 5 (criticizing the second directive).
197 See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (2012).
198 Alternatively (or in addition), the IRS directive can be viewed as determining relevance (in practice), which is outside the IRS’s authority under the
statute. See § 7701(o)(5)(C).
199 See § 7701(o)(1).
194

2018]

ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE

233

the directive requires analysis of far more than just variants of the
objective and subjective prongs set forth in the statute, before the
doctrine can be raised.200 The directive thus can be read as changing the statutory minimum (in effect): even transactions that fail
the code’s objective and subjective prongs are safe from having the
economic substance doctrine raised if they meet some (unspecified)
combination of the directive’s eighteen (or thirty-five) factors.
That is the directive’s practical result, although the directive
technically governs examiners’ behavior in raising the doctrine
rather than literally setting forth a test (or safe harbor) for meeting the doctrine. A transaction can fail one or both prongs (which
would cause failure under the newly required conjunctive test or
under former versions of the disjunctive test, respectively) and
still be exempt from an economic substance analysis under the
directive’s factors (although such factors are vague).
Because the IRS has created a policy under which a transaction must fail more than just one of the two prongs before such
transaction is treated as lacking economic substance, that standard (more taxpayer favorable than the conjunctive test) appears
questionable under the statutory language. Now that Congress
has mandated the conjunctive test (meaning that taxpayers must
meet both prongs, and that failing even one prong is sufficient to
fail the economic substance test),201 how can the directive require
that eighteen factors be analyzed before the doctrine is even raised?
For that reason, the directive is arguably an invalid exercise of
administrative discretion (because it appears to allow a transaction that fails one or both prongs to nonetheless avoid the economic
substance analysis, thereby de facto being respected as having
economic substance).
But the extent of the IRS’s authority only matters if any taxpayer (or other member of the public) has standing202 to challenge
200 Compare I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15,
2011) (eighteen factors and multiple steps), with § 7701(o)(1) (requiring application
of the subjective and objective prongs).
201 See § 7701(o)(1).
202 See Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1885–86
(1996) (describing the judicial principle that a “generalized grievance,” suffered
by a large group of citizens, cannot supply standing); Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in
Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY
L.J. 771, 782, 832, 842 (2003) (agreeing that it is difficult for taxpayers to
achieve standing on the basis of a generalized grievance regarding federal tax
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it and wishes to do so. This is unlikely, because taxpayers are
generally not prone to challenge the validity of anything that
makes the IRS less likely to apply the economic substance doctrine,
especially given the high penalties that are now associated with
the doctrine.203
The two directives appear to largely survive the later issuance of Notice 2014-58,204 with one exception. The notice’s rules
issues, attempting to find a pattern in federal courts’ treatment of such standing
issues, and contrasting the (more taxpayer-favorable) treatment of generalized
grievance standing issues regarding state and local taxes, even in the federal
courts); Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of
the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 847 (2012) (considering whether third parties,
not the subject of potential IRS enforcement actions, have standing to challenge
the IRS’s lack of action); cf. Daniel Jacob Hemel & David Kamin, The False
Promise of Presidential Indexation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25, 2832), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=318
4051 (discussing the difficulty of achieving standing to challenge potential IRS
regulations that index the bases of capital assets, and suggesting that states
might have such standing if the states’ income tax is computed by reference
to the federal income tax calculation). But see Patrick J. Smith, Standing Issues
in Direct APA Challenges to Tax Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 24, 2015,
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/litigation-and-appeals/standing-is
sues-direct-apa-challenges-tax-regulations/2015/11/24/g083?highlight=%29%
20Standing%20Issues%20in%20Direct%20APA%20Challenges%20to%20Tax%
20Regulations%20Standing%20Issues%20in%20Direct%20APA%20Challenges
%20to%20Tax%20Regulations (arguing that a taxpayer need not suffer a direct
injury in order to have standing to challenge the validity of an IRS regulation).
See generally Mark Gabel, Note, Generalized Grievances and Judicial Discretion,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 1331 (2007) (discussing the generalized grievance doctrine
and its evolution over time). It is not clear whether the standing requirement
with respect to agency inaction might be different than the criteria for standing to challenge the validity of a Treasury regulation, because the former is a
failure to act, while the latter is an active publication of a rule. Conceivably,
the IRS’s communication of its unwillingness to assert the economic substance
doctrine, through its internal letters to its own employees, could be viewed as
an action (rather than inaction). There would remain, however, the issue of
whether any specific taxpayer suffered identifiable, particularized harm, rather
than a generalized grievance shared with a large class of taxpayers or citizens,
as a result of the IRS’s decision not to apply the economic substance doctrine (or
to apply it only rarely).
203 See § 6662(b)(6) (2018) (imposing a strict liability penalty for tax deficiencies attributable to lack of economic substance (as defined under section
7701(o))). See also §§ 6662(c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
204 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); Andrew
Velarde, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: ‘Wait-and-See’ Approach for More
Economic Substance Guidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 9, 2015, https://www
.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/penalties/aba-section-taxation-meeting-wait-and-see
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regarding similar rules of law appear to override the second
directive’s statement that no doctrine will be treated as similar
rule of law until further guidance is issued.205 Notice 2014-58 appears to constitute such further guidance.206 In other respects,
the directives survive as rules for IRS employees. Although these
are technically internal directives within the IRS, they are available to the public, and taxpayers read and rely on them as if they
were intended as taxpayer guidance.207
III. AGENCY RESPONSE TO AND CERTAIN BIGGER PICTURE ISSUES
RAISED BY SECTION 7701(O)
A. Issues Regarding the Agency
1. Interaction Between the Three Branches of Federal
Government
Section 7701(o)208 raises some interesting issues about the
interaction between the three branches of the Federal government.
First, it presents a rare instance of the legislative branch writing
-approach-more-economic-substance-guidance/2015/02/09/qy3v?highlight=Ap
proach%20for%20More%20Economic%20Substance%20Guidance (“Rochelle
Hodes, attorney-adviser, Treasury Office of Tax Legislative Counsel [speaking at
an American Bar Association meeting in 2015] ... said that Notice 2014-58, 201444 IRB 746, released in October 2014, in no way overrules previous IRS Large
Business and International Division directives from 2010 (LMSB-04-0910 -024)
and 2011 (LB&I-04-0711-015), which still serve as guidance to examiners and
managers.”).
205 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S.
Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
206 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S.
Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
207 See Rosenberg, supra note 2; see also Marie Sapirie, Increase in Informal
Guidance Unlikely to Stop Soon, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 23, 2012, https://www
.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/audits/increase-informal-guidance-unlikely-stop-soon
/2012/01/23/qpsv?highlight=%29%20Increase%20in%20Informal%20Guidance
%20Unlikely%20to%20Stop%20Soon%20Increase%20in%20Informal%20Guid
ance%20Unlikely%20to%20Stop%20Soon (“‘As a practical matter, if a position
is taken in an industry directive, for all intents and purposes I think a taxpayer
can in practice rely on that,’ said Roland Barral, area counsel (financial services
industry), IRS Large Business and International Division;” some practitioners
expressed reluctance to rely on the second economic substance directive due to
concerns about the application of penalties to “similar rules of law,” but that was
before Notice 2014-58 laid such concerns to rest).
208 See § 7701(o) (2012) (codifying the judicial doctrine of economic substance).
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rules about the substance of a court-developed doctrine of interpretation in the tax area—not a procedural rule about what
kinds of evidence are admissible,209 or what the standard of proof
should be, but the content of a judicial rule for respecting tax benefits. This appears to be an unusual level of involvement by the
legislative branch regarding a set of substantive rules developed
by the courts, except that the whole point of the economic substance doctrine is to implement Congressional intent.210 Therefore,
perhaps it is logical for Congress to tell the judiciary how it
wishes its own intent to be tested. Even if logical, this is an atypical example of Congress altering a broad judicial rule that applies
generally to many tax benefits, rather than Congress correcting
the judiciary’s interpretation of one specific statutory provision.211
Further, section 7701(o) includes Congressional delegation of regulatory authority to the Treasury. This allows the agency (the IRS)
to mandate changes (for the first time) to a long-standing judicial
doctrine, by means of issuing guidance under section 7701(o).212
2. Agency Authority to Issue Guidance
a. Grant of Regulatory Authority
The biggest impact of section 7701(o) may be that it grants
the Treasury the authority to issue guidance that changes, expands,
209 See, e.g., § 6110(j)(3) (2007) (indicating that non-binding IRS rulings are
not admissible in court); Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-7(b) (1988) (indicating that “a
written determination may not be used or cited as precedent ….”).
210 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon
Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that the economic
substance doctrine is meant to implement Congressional intent).
211 See, e.g., § 901(i) (2010). There has been some dispute in the past as to
whether Treasury regulations can override a pre-existing judicial interpretation of a statute. For example, the “Mexican Railroad cases” held that Treasury
regulations could not have that effect. See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 497
F.2d 1386, 204 Ct. Cl. 837 (1974); Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. United
States, 455 F.2d 993 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973);
Mo.-Ill. R.R. Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1001 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Mo. Pac. R.R.
Co. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part on other grounds, 411 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1969). See generally Rev. Rul.
78-256; G.C.M. 37264 (1977). In that instance, Congress solved the dispute between the courts and the agency by enacting a new statutory provision, section
901(i), that reflected the challenged regulations’ rules. See § 901(i).
212 See §§ 7701(o), 7805(a) (2012).
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or constrains the judicial anti-abuse doctrine of economic substance
(by issuing guidance under section 7701(o)).213 Section 7701(o) has
thus shifted the balance of power in the development of the economic substance doctrine away from the courts and towards the
Treasury—but only if the Treasury chooses to exercise its regulatory authority.
The scope of the Treasury’s regulatory authority regarding
economic substance varies depending on the particular sub-issue.214
Section 7701(o) contains specific regulatory authority (a mandate,
actually) only with respect to the treatment of foreign taxes as a
cost in computing profit (“in appropriate cases”).215 In contrast,
Congress specifically reserved the relevance determination to the
courts, depriving Treasury of the ability to issue guidance on that
topic.216 But for all other aspects of section 7701(o) (with the
possible exception of the definition of the tested transaction),217 the
Treasury has general regulatory authority under section 7805.218
It therefore can presumably issue guidance regarding any wording or concepts contained in section 7701(o) (with the exceptions
discussed above). For example, the Treasury clearly has authority
to issue guidance on what constitutes “meaningful” change in economic position, for purposes of the objective prong.219 Potentially, such guidance could even be retroactive if it is characterized
as an anti-abuse rule (because anti-abuse rules are an exception
See § 7805(a) (granting the Treasury the authority to issue “rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title”).
214 Compare § 7701(o)(2)(B) (“The Secretary shall issue regulations requiring
foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in determining pre-tax profit in appropriate
cases”), with id. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner
as if this subsection had never been enacted ….”).
215 § 7701(o)(2)(B).
216 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
217 The definition of the tested “transaction” is not explicitly reserved to the
courts, in contrast to the relevance issue. Compare § 7701(o)(5)(D) (addressing
transactions), with id. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (discussing relevance). But the statute’s
description of the “transaction” is consistent with case law, and the legislative
history states that the statute was not intended to change the courts’ ability to
aggregate and disaggregate steps or actions in order to define which steps or actions should be tested together as one transaction. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443,
at 296–97 (2010). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2.
218 See § 7805(a).
219 See § 7701(o)(1)(A).
213
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from the general requirement that Treasury guidance must be
prospective only).220 But the agency has so far chosen to issue
only two notices, and two internal letters to its own employees,
on the subject of section 7701(o).221
If granting regulatory authority is one of the most important
aspects of section 7701(o), but the IRS has not used its guidance
authority to do much, other than with respect to penalties and
reporting requirements (mostly just saying that it will follow presection-7701(o) case law on other issues)—then how much has
section 7701(o) done, really? Even if there has not been much
substantive guidance on section 7701(o) so far, the Treasury has
the ability to issue additional guidance about the economic substance doctrine in the future.222 Also, section 7701(o) contains several mandatory rules (e.g., the profit ratio rule and the requirement
for “substantial” non-tax purpose that does not duplicate the
objective prong) that apply even without Treasury guidance.223
The lack of extensive guidance (more than eight years after section 7701(o)’s enactment) raises an additional question.224
The IRS has the authority to issue guidance on the economic
substance doctrine and has shown itself willing to litigate economic substance issues under pre-section-7701(o) case law.225 If
the agency is willing to take positions on the interpretation of the
economic substance doctrine in litigation, why has not it issued
See § 7805(b)(3).
See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024,
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM
20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
222 See § 7805(a).
223 See §§ 7701(o)(1)(B), (o)(2)(A). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2.
224 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024,
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM
20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
225 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 107, 125
(2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016); Salem Fin., Inc. v.
United States, 786 F.3d 932, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366
(2016); Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017); Wells Fargo & Co.
v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1440 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal docketed, No.
17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017).
220
221
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guidance? Guidance presumably would be more efficient than litigating: more likely to succeed in implementing the IRS’s view, less
expensive for the U.S. government in general (in terms of collecting
tax revenue, as balanced against the costs of litigation or of issuing guidance), and faster and more efficient (in terms of total time
expired and person hours consumed). It would, for example, significantly lessen the government’s risk of losing future economic
substance litigation (for cases addressing transactions that occur
after section 7701(o)’s effective date), because the IRS could write
government-favorable rules. To be fair, the economic substance
cases that the government has litigated so far are pre-section7701(o) transactions, and would not have been affected by guidance issued under section 7701(o).226 For those cases, therefore, the
government did not have a choice between litigating or issuing
guidance, because the IRS had no regulatory authority with respect
to the economic substance doctrine for the time periods at issue.
But issuing guidance could prevent future litigation or improve
the government’s odds of winning future cases. Section 7701(o)’s
effective date has applied for years now, so cases applying that
section should be arriving in the courts soon (if the IRS chooses
to raise the issue).
b. Informal Guidance Issued by the IRS
The Treasury has issued two notices on section 7701(o) so
Other than discussing the penalty provisions applicable to
section 7701(o) deficiencies, the notices mostly just say that the
IRS will continue to follow conjunctive-test economic substance case
law (which currently consists solely of pre-section-7701(o) case
law).228 For example, the notices say that the IRS will continue
to apply existing case law to determine if the transaction meets
the two prongs described in 7701(o).229 This fails to acknowledge
far.227

See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 107, 125; Salem Fin., Inc.,
786 F.3d at 951; Santander Holdings USA, Inc., 844 F.3d 15; Wells Fargo & Co.,
260 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
227 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
228 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
229 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). The IRS says
that it will apply the statute’s profit ratio test for both prongs, as a prerequisite
226
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that section 7701(o)’s descriptions of the two prongs might differ
from the descriptions in pre-7701(o) case law.230 In particular, it
does not address the definition of “meaningful” change in the objective prong or the “substantial” standard in the profit ratio test.231
It also does not admit that, under section 7701(o), it might not
be possible to meet the business purpose requirement solely by a
showing of potential profit (or by otherwise duplicating the objective prong).232
However, practically speaking, continuing to use pre-7701(o)
case law to define the objective and subjective prongs (even after
section 7701(o) takes effect) is a taxpayer-favorable position,233
and therefore unlikely to face a challenge from taxpayers. However, courts might disagree with the IRS’s interpretation of the two
prongs sua sponte, in theory.234 It is also theoretically possible that
the Department of Justice (DOJ), litigating on behalf of the U.S.
government, might take a different litigating position about the
meaning of the two prongs than the IRS has taken in its notices.235

before “profit motive” can be taken into account. But it also says that “[i]n
performing this calculation, the IRS will apply existing relevant case law and
other published guidance.” Presumably, the IRS does not mean that it will use
the “de minimis” or “insignificant” profit descriptors of pre-7701(o) case law to
interpret the statute’s profit ratio test. See supra note 99 and accompanying
text (citing Sheldon and other cases). Such an interpretation of the section
7701(o) prongs would seem vulnerable to a validity challenge, if any taxpayer
had standing and chose to question the rule. Practically speaking, though,
the agency has more leeway on validity concerns whenever the guidance at
issue favors taxpayers.
230 See Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 49) (discussing the impact
of codification on the business purpose prong).
231 See I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2012); I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40
I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
232 See Rosenberg, supra note 2.
233 See id.
234 See generally Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
235 The IRS represents the government in the Tax Court. In all other courts
(including the Court of Claims, the District Courts, and all appellate courts),
the Department of Justice (DOJ) represents the U.S. government. The taxpayer
can choose which court will hear its tax case: the Tax Court, the Court of Claims,
or the applicable District Court. Therefore, practically speaking, the taxpayer
can choose to litigate against the IRS rather than DOJ, or vice versa. One additional factor is that taxpayers need not pay the disputed tax before challenging
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The notices, because they are informal vehicles, are not binding
on the courts236 or on the Department of Justice. Technically,
literally, they are not binding on taxpayers—they only set forth
the IRS’s policy on how it will interpret section 7701(o).237 The
notices are not a vehicle that requires deference from the courts
(unlike, for example, regulations that are issued after notice and
comment procedures). These notices thus leave the courts (and
taxpayers) able to argue for their own interpretation of the statutory language. But the notices are likely to be good predictors
of the IRS’s litigation positions, and its positions on audit with
respect to the economic substance doctrine.238
The other substantive issue addressed in the notices is the
idea that “rules of law” (which, like economic substance issues,
trigger mandatory penalties) are limited to judicial doctrines that
use the same factors and analysis as section 7701(o), and that are
asserted in cases where the IRS is also raising section 7701(o).239
In other words, the IRS will not enforce the statutory requirement regarding penalties for “similar rules of law.”240
With respect to administrative guidance, the focus (by both
the Treasury and taxpayers) appears to have been on the penalty
consequences of section 7701(o) issues, rather than the substantive impact of section 7701(o) on the economic substance doctrine.241
that tax in the Tax Court, while payment of the tax is required before a case is
brought in a District Court or the Court of Claims.
236 See supra text accompanying note 87. Cf. William Funk, Administrative
Law Discussion Forum: Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
1023 (2004) (suggesting that legislation could address the level of judicial deference that should be given to various types of administrative guidance); Todd
Rakoff, The Choice between Formal and Informal Modes of Agency Guidance, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (2000) (discussing the Food and Drug Administration’s increasing use of informal methods of communicating guidance to the public).
237 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
238 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
239 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).
240 See discussion supra at Section II.B; see also notes 132–47 and accompanying text.
241 Cf. Richard M. Lipton, “Codification” of the Economic Substance Doctrine—
Much Ado About Nothing, 112 J. TAX’N 325, 329 (2010) (“In many respects,
the most important aspect of the new legislation is not the substantive law
concerning the definition of economic substance but rather the penalty that is
imposed on transactions that lack economic substance.”).
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There appears to have been less emphasis on the rules for determining whether a transaction lacks economic substance (and
whether section 7701(o) has changed those rules) and more attention on the increased penalties caused by other statutory
changes that accompanied section 7701(o). The notices discuss
(and perhaps received the most attention for) the situations to
which the enhanced penalties will apply.242
The IRS has also issued two internal letters (or directives)
to its own employees regarding the application of the economic substance doctrine.243 The second letter requires examiners to consider eighteen factors, to complete a written report, and to obtain
approval from multiple levels of managers before asserting the
economic substance doctrine.244 These requirements appear likely
to deter IRS employees (at least those in the Large Business and
International (LB&I) division) from raising the issue.245 The motivation for these internal procedural hurdles appears again to be
IRS reluctance to impose the enhanced penalties associated with
the economic substance doctrine.
The IRS’s issuance of instructions to its own examiners
raises issues about the interaction between such informal IRS directives and the IRS’s regulatory authority. Taxpayers read the former
for guidance,246 although technically it is not binding on the courts,
can be changed at will by the IRS, is not addressed to taxpayers,
and cannot be relied on by taxpayers.247 In particular, one could
debate the appropriateness of the IRS using this type of directive
See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). Similarly, the internal IRS guidance
seems intended to avoid imposing such enhanced penalties. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir.
LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
243 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14,
2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
244 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
245 See Sheppard, supra note 5 (arguing that the LB&I directive discourage
IRS employees from raising the economic substance doctrine).
246 See Rosenberg, supra note 2; supra text accompanying note 208; see also,
e.g., Jensen, supra note 61, at 38 (implying that the 2011 directive had the same
weight of authority as Notice 2014-58 and noting that “some commentators have
complained that [the notice’s reference to the sham transaction doctrine] …
contradicts guidance provided by the Service not so long ago [meaning the
2011 internal IRS directive].”).
247 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
242
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as a means to narrow the impact of (or contradict the clear mandate of) statutory language, in a manner that the Treasury could
not accomplish by formal guidance248 (because it does not have
regulatory authority to either define relevance, alter the statutory
mandate for strict liability penalties, or respect as having economic
substance a transaction that fails either of the two prongs listed
in section 7701(o)).249
The IRS’s directives arguably present an instance of an
agency thwarting Congressional intent via internal guidance to
its employees (which also impacts taxpayer behavior, because the
guidance is publicly available). Yet no one is likely to challenge
the agency’s authority to limit the application of section 7701(o),
because such limits are generally taxpayer favorable (because the
consequences of applying the economic substance doctrine may
often be harsher—especially when penalties are taken into account—than the use of other rules available to the agency).250
The IRS has thus arguably accomplished an end run around
its lack of regulatory authority regarding “relevance.”251 (Taxpayers indeed had asked the IRS to provide guidance on relevance,
248 Cf. American Air Liquide, Inc. v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 23, 27 (2001) (holding
that the executive branch cannot frustrate Congressional intent by declining
to issue regulations to provide a rule called for by a statute); Int’l Multifoods
Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 25, 38 (1997). If the executive branch cannot, by passive
inaction, prevent legislation from taking effect, how can affirmative executive
action (not formal guidance but written directives to employees) appropriately
have that same impact of preventing a statutorily envisioned rule from taking
effect? One could argue that the IRS is merely exercising its enforcement discretion, or that section 7701(o) does not require that the economic substance doctrine
be used (but merely sets parameters that apply if and when the doctrine is raised).
249 See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2018); id. §§ 7701(o)(1), (o)(5)(c) (2012); see also
Jensen, supra note 60, at 31–32.
250 If a transaction lacks economic substance, it is disregarded for federal
income tax purposes, which is harsher than the result under many other antiabuse rules. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also Rosenberg, supra
note 63, at 169 n.12. However, sometimes the economic substance doctrine produces a countervailing benefit for the taxpayer, because it causes all tax effects of a transaction to be disregarded (including taxpayer-unfavorable effects
like income inclusions). But the increased penalties currently associated with
failing the economic substance doctrine are likely to exceed any taxpayer advantage from disregarding an income inclusion, even if such benefit was not
already outweighed by the taxpayer’s loss of the originally claimed tax benefit (such as an interest deduction or foreign tax credit).
251 See § 7701(o)(5)(c).
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despite such lack of authority.)252 So far, none of the Treasury’s
written pronouncements regarding section 7701(o) (two notices and
two letters to IRS employees) are binding (non-reversable) on the
IRS as an institution,253 nor can they technically be relied on by
taxpayers. Nor are courts bound to follow the notices or the directives.254 But taxpayers react to both such notices and such letters as if these communications from the IRS can be relied on.255
Because the notices256 and (especially) the internal IRS
directives are informal types of “guidance,” there is no formal notice and comment procedure for them, and the Treasury appears
to believe that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not
apply to such vehicles.257 Also, because the notices and letters are
not technically binding on the IRS or on taxpayers, and might not
literally constitute “guidance,” their validity as a permissible exercise of agency power seems harder to challenge as a procedural matter. Nor is there an obvious avenue for objecting to the content of
the notices or letters, because they are informal. Conversely, however, the notices and letters function as—i.e., are respected by both
taxpayers and the IRS as if they were—official, binding guidance.258
The IRS’s written instructions to its examiners, essentially
ordering them not to raise the economic substance issue unless it
is the only (or the best) option, and requiring many procedural hurdles before examiners can raise the doctrine in any circumstances,
See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010).
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
The letters to LB&I employees may be binding on such employees, but the IRS
(following its own institutional processes) can change or ignore the content of
such letters any time it chooses to do so.
254 See Pritired 1, LLC v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693, 728 (S.D. Iowa
2011) (“A notice is akin to a ‘revenue ruling’ and is an interpretation of the law
offered by the IRS. While not binding precedent, revenue rulings—and notices—
are entitled to ‘some weight,’ because the IRS ‘consider[s] them authoritative
and binding.’”) (citations omitted).
255 See supra text accompanying notes 247–48.
256 See Pritired 1, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (stating that IRS notices should be
given “some weight,” on the theory that they are similar to revenue rulings).
257 See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th
Cir. 1998). See generally Book, supra note 17, at 547–51 (discussing the manner in which the IRS issues informal guidance).
258 See supra text accompanying notes 206–08.
252
253
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arguably circumvent the will of Congress.259 For example, if a
claimed tax benefit could be challenged under both the step transaction doctrine and the economic substance doctrine, and the IRS
uses only the former grounds (decreasing its chances of prevailing
in court, and preventing the application of the enhanced penalties
associated the section 7701(o)), does that raise issues regarding
the acceptable limits of agency discretion?
If the IRS attempts to discourage agents from raising economic substance issues (perhaps even when it is the only or best
argument), does that choice by the agency arguably violate separation of powers principles by effectively repealing legislation (by
refusing to apply it)? Where is the line between invalid frustration of Congressional intent by the agency, on the one hand, and
valid exercise of agency discretion, on the other (e.g., if the agency
does not have the resources to follow through on everything required by the statute)?260 Are enforcement priorities more allowable
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
See generally NINA E. OLSON, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 2017, at vii (Dec. 31, 2017) (“Funding cuts have rendered
the IRS unable to provide acceptable levels of taxpayer service, unable to upgrade its technology to improve its efficiency and effectiveness, and unable to
maintain compliance programs that promote both compliance and protect
taxpayer rights.”); John A. Koskinen, Woodworth Lecture: The Challenges
Facing the IRS of the Future, 159 TAX NOTES 1163 (May 21, 2018) (discussing
funding, resources, and staffing challenges faced by the IRS).
The “Brand X doctrine,” regarding the courts’ application of Chevron deference, doesn’t appear to apply to IRS choices to enforce or not enforce the economic substance doctrine, e.g., on the theory that the IRS is declining to follow
case law precedent interpreting the statute. The Brand X doctrine holds that:
“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency interpretation.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). See generally Hemel &
Kamin, supra note 202 (manuscript at 18). The Brand X doctrine appears to apply
where a court has interpreted a statute, and then an agency issues a contrary
interpretation of the same statute. So far, at least, no court has interpreted
section 7701(o)—the economic substance statute—as compared to pre-section
7701(o) judicial applications of the doctrine. There is therefore no prior judicial interpretation of section 7701(o) (currently) with which the IRS statements
about section 7701(o) can conflict (unless one argues that section 7701(o) incorporates prior case law by reference). One could also argue that the IRS decision
259
260
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in the form of unwritten practices than as written communications
(even informal guidance) to the public? The IRS (like any agency)
understandably has enforcement priorities, and makes choices
about the use of enforcement resources. But the IRS’s approach
to the economic substance doctrine is a little unusual because it
involves apparent reluctance to apply an entire doctrine (an
entire legal argument)—in almost any circumstances—rather than
a decision not to apply a particular statute or legal principle in
specific, narrow fact circumstances.261
Are these issues ameliorated because IRS examiners can
raise economic substance arguments, if they meet the required
internal procedural hurdles and receive permission as required by
the LB&I letter? Asserting such economic substance arguments is
therefore not prohibited outright, even if the paperwork and approval requirements turn out to have the same effect, in practice.
One could potentially argue that the IRS’s disinclination to
raise economic substance issues does not constitute lack of enforcement of the statute, and is not mean the IRS is disregarding the
statute. Rather, one could say, the statute neither creates nor
to deter enforcement of the economic substance doctrine does not involve the
“construction” or interpretation of a statute, but rather the choice of whether
to enforce or apply the statute at all.
261 For example, the IRS has previously issued informal guidance (addressed
to the public) indicating that it will not contest foreign tax credit creditability
claims for specific foreign taxes, that it will not assert that frequent flyer miles
earned during business travel constitute income (in specific circumstances), and
that it will not argue that fans’ catching of baseballs during baseball games is
income (in particular circumstances). See Ann. 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 621 (frequent
flyer miles); I.R.-98-56 (IRS News Release regarding baseballs); Notice 2008-3,
2008-1 C.B. 253 (stating that the IRS will not contest creditability of the Mexican
“IETU” tax). But all of these address narrow fact patterns, rather than publicly stating a disinterest in asserting an entire legal theory (with the possible
exception of egregious transactions, although the second directive’s procedural
hurdles apply in all circumstances).
These examples also consist of communications that were officially addressed
to the public, unlike the internal IRS directives, which were addressed to IRS
employees. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15,
2011); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). It
doesn’t seem logical that the IRS should have more enforcement discretion if
it uses informal communication with taxpayers (e.g., communication not directly addressed to taxpayers at all) compared to official, formal guidance (such
as regulations).
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requires the use of the economic substance doctrine, but instead
merely provides that if the IRS or the courts choose to use the economic substance doctrine, then the doctrine’s content must follow
the requirements of section 7701(o). Under this interpretation,
the IRS is free to ignore section 7701(o) unless and until it decides to raise economic substance issues in particular taxpayer
cases, at which time its economic substance arguments must
comply with section 7701(o)’s rules. But Congress unambiguously
intended to strengthen the economic substance doctrine, and meant
for the doctrine to continue to be used where appropriate.262
Although the IRS can decide when to raise economic substance
issues (and could also make such choices before the doctrine was
codified), the de facto decision that the doctrine should never be
raised (or almost never) seems contrary to Congress’s intent in
enacting section 7701(o).
Practically speaking, any authority issues regarding the
Treasury’s ability to take the approaches described in the notices
and the internal IRS directives (including any issues regarding the
agency’s role under separation of powers principles) only have an
impact if someone challenges those pieces of informal guidance.263
Taxpayers who benefit from an IRS position do not generally
challenge the IRS’s authority regarding such taxpayer-favorable
guidance (for obvious reasons).264 It is not clear whether any other
H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010).
Cf., e.g., Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 114 (2015) (discussing taxpayer’s challenge to the validity of an IRS regulation), rev’d, 2018 WL
3542989 (9th Cir. 2018).
264 One could imagine, however, circumstances (not commonly occurring, but
possible) in which taxpayers might want to challenge the validity of the notices
or the internal IRS directives and their content. (In that case, the issue might
be whether such a person technically has standing to raise such challenge, and
in what venue.) For example, assume the following facts: Buyer Corp buys business Z from Seller Corp. The sales contract provides that if the IRS imposes
additional tax or interest after the sale with respect to transactions of business
Z that occurred in years before the sale, Seller Corp must reimburse Buyer for
such taxes and interest (as well as legal fees and any penalties), but only if
penalties are imposed. If no penalties are imposed, Seller Corp is not required
to reimburse Buyer Corp for any of such amounts (including additional tax or
interest). Assume that the IRS raises an issue on audit regarding a pre-sale year of
business Z. Buyer Corp wants Seller Corp to be responsible for any additional
amounts that the IRS collects by reason of such issue (for the pre-sale year). The
dollar amounts are large. The IRS asserts another ground, rather than section
262
263
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person (anyone not directly affected by the informal guidance) has
standing to bring such a challenge.265 Essentially, the agency can
issue any content it likes through informal guidance, as long as
there is no fact pattern in which a taxpayer or other person would
a) want to, b) have standing to, and c) have a procedural mechanism to challenge the Treasury’s authority to do so.266 A taxpayer
who did meet those criteria might challenge the informal guidance267 on the grounds that a) it may be invalid because it may
be inconsistent with section 7701(o) and with Congressional intent
regarding that statute and its associated penalties, or b) if it functions (and is treated in every way except admissibility in court)
as if it were a regulation (as if it were formal guidance), then it
must follow administrative law procedures that apply to regulations (such as notice and comment procedures).
3. IRS Deterred from Raising Economic Substance Issues
Congress seems to have accomplished, in some ways, the
opposite of what it intended to achieve with section 7701(o). 268
7701(o) or economic substance, and does not attempt to collect penalties. Buyer
Corp now is motivated to try to get the IRS to raise section 7701(o) and to assert
strict liability penalties.
265 See Zelenak, supra note 202, at 847 (considering whether third parties, not
the subject of potential IRS enforcement actions, have standing to challenge the
IRS’s lack of action). See generally Staudt, supra note 202, at 782 (agreeing that
it is difficult for taxpayers to achieve standing on the basis of a generalized grievance regarding federal tax issues, attempting to find a pattern in federal courts’
treatment of such standing issues, and contrasting the (more taxpayer-favorable)
treatment of generalized grievance standing issues regarding state and local
taxes, even in the federal courts). See supra text accompanying note 201.
266 See generally Zelenak, supra note 202 (discussing pro-taxpayer IRS decisions not to enforce statutory rules in certain fact patterns, considering that the
IRS has less leeway, practically speaking, to act in taxpayer-unfavorable ways,
and discussing standing to challenge taxpayer-favorable agency actions).
267 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Treas. Dir.
LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Notice 2010-62,
2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM
20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
268 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010) (expressing Congressional intent to make the economic substance doctrine more effective); Sheppard, supra
note 5 (arguing that the IRS has essentially stopped enforcing the economic
substance doctrine).
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Counterintuitively, strict liability penalties associated with economic substance issues (and enacted at the same time as section
7701(o)) may prevent or substantially lessen the application of the
economic substance doctrine in practice, by discouraging the IRS
from raising the issue.269 The IRS’s instructions to its employees
make it less likely that such IRS employees will raise economic
substance issues, because such instructions require consideration of
eighteen factors, completion of a written report, and approval from
multiple levels of managers.270 The IRS’s expressed aversion to
raising economic substance issues appears to be caused not by
section 7701(o) itself, but by the accompanying amendments to
various penalty provisions.271 Those amendments imposed twenty percent and forty percent penalties, without reasonable basis
exceptions, for deficiencies asserted under the economic substance doctrine (as defined in section 7701(o)).272 The two notices
published with regard to section 7701(o), like the two directives,
similarly show a disinclination to apply such penalties.273
If the IRS does not attempt to collect tax under economic
substance arguments, then taxpayers do not wind up in court on
economic substance issues, and courts never get involved. In
that case, the courts will have no opportunity to apply the doctrine (unless they find a way to raise it sua sponte, in cases that
arrive in court for other reasons), and no opportunity to interpret
section 7701(o)’s effects.274
Because the IRS’s internal rules that impede agents from
raising economic substance issues are publicly available,275 the
See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
However, that directive applies to the Large Business and International Division,
and not to the other divisions of the IRS.
270 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
271 Cf. Sheppard, supra note 5 (“In LB&I-04-0711-015, the IRS has instructed
examiners not to assert the penalty against large business taxpayers. The directive
accomplishes this by setting insurmountable hurdles in front of agents, some
of whom, thankfully, seem to be ignoring the instruction.”).
272 See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6)(c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
273 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4
-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20
-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010).
274 See Jensen, supra note 60, at 28.
275 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
269
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economic substance doctrine arguably loses any deterrent effect
on aggressive tax planning (at least for taxpayers under the
jurisdiction of the relevant IRS division), because taxpayers know
that the IRS is unlikely to raise the economic substance issue. Of
course, the IRS’s guidance to its examiners is not binding on the
IRS and can change at any time.
The enhanced penalty provisions’ apparent effect on the
IRS is ironic because stricter penalties—strict liability with no reasonable basis exception—were presumably meant to make the
consequences of failing the economic substance analysis harsher
for taxpayers (and possibly to deter hyperaggressive tax planning),276 not to prevent the doctrine from ever being applied. Also,
Congress appeared to approve of the economic substance doctrine as a tool for judicial safeguarding of Congressional intent,
rather than intending the doctrine to be applied less frequently
than it was before codification.277 Congress imposed rules on how
the doctrine should be applied, but did not indicate in any way
that courts should stop using the doctrine.278 Instead, the House
Report accompanying section 7701(o) says that codification was
meant “to provide greater clarity and uniformity in the application of the economic substance doctrine in order to improve its
effectiveness at deterring unintended consequences.”279
Congress left the relevance determination to the courts
rather than limiting the doctrine’s application (and even prevented
the Treasury from issuing guidance on relevance).280 In fact,
mandating two prongs (in section 7701(o)) makes the doctrine
276 Congressional budget estimators apparently did not expect the strict
liability penalties to have a deterrent effect on courts or on IRS enforcement—
presumably, that is why they scored the entire legislative package (section 7701(o)
and the penalty provision amendments) as a revenue raiser. See Lipton, supra
note 241, at 325 (noting that “although there was no official breakdown [of the
revenue estimates between section 7701(o) and its accompanying penalty amendments], it is likely that much of the revenue will be generated by the strict
liability penalty.”). Congress appears to have expected the penalties to be actually applied. See generally Jensen, supra note 19, at 30 (the “strict liability
penalty ... may be more important than the substantive rules in deterring
questionable taxpayer behavior .... A penalty of that magnitude should be
enough to get anyone’s attention.”).
277 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010).
278 See id. See generally I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012).
279 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010) (emphasis added).
280 See § 7701(o)(5)(C).
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tougher, by making it harder for taxpayers to satisfy.281 Requiring that reasonably expected profit be substantial in comparison
to tax benefits (before profit potential can be taken into account
in meeting the two prongs) may also have been intended to make
the doctrine more stringent.282 Thus, Congress may have meant
to make the economic substance doctrine a stronger safeguard
for Congressional intent and a better weapon against unintended tax benefits.283 Instead, the penalty changes enacted in 2010
have conversely weakened the economic substance doctrine’s impact on taxpayers by making the IRS (very publicly) less willing
to apply it.284
Lessening any deterrent effect of the economic substance
doctrine is arguably a policy problem only in instances where
economic substance is the only (or strongest) argument against a
transaction.285 But the economic substance doctrine, by its nature, applies where the literal words of Code and regulatory
requirements are met,286 and those are exactly the fact patterns
in which there may be few other strong arguments available to
the IRS, e.g., few arguments under the words of the Code and
regulations. There may instead be alternative arguments under
other anti-abuse rules, such as section 269,287 the partnership
anti-abuse rules,288 and judicial doctrines such as the business
purpose and step transaction doctrines.289 Then again, in some
See id. § 7701(o)(1); see also Jensen, supra note 60, at 29.
See § 7701(o)(2)(A); see also Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 173.
283 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295.
284 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15,
2011). See generally Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement,
69 TAX L. REV. 73, 124–26 (2015) (discussing agency non-enforcement choices,
and positing that it is more legitimate for the agency to state clearly its nonenforcement policies than to keep them hidden).
285 The IRS internal guidance technically still allows examiners to raise
the economic substance doctrine in such cases, although it imposes internal
procedural hurdles even if raising the issue is justified. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir.
LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
286 See generally supra text accompanying notes 1, 2, 5.
287 See I.R.C. § 269 (2014).
288 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995).
289 See Lipton, supra note 241, at 32 (2010); infra notes 309–10 (discussing
differences and overlaps between the economic substance doctrine and other
anti-abuse doctrines, such as the step transaction, substance over form, and
sham transaction doctrines).
281
282
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fact patterns (e.g., the STARS cases), those alternative arguments
may be weaker than the economic substance doctrine.290
Although it appears generally reluctant to raise the economic substance doctrine, the IRS is willing to state in regulatory
preambles that it reserves the right to scrutinize transactions under
the economic substance doctrine as well as under other judicial
doctrines.291 Therefore, it has not entirely foreclosed the possibility of raising the doctrine. It may still be willing to raise economic substance issues in especially egregious cases.
In theory, one could challenge the IRS’s stated reluctance to
apply the economic substance doctrine, which arguably contravenes
Congressional intent (if the issue of standing could be addressed).292
But courts have generally been reluctant to review agency inaction,
In some of the recent STARS cases, the government began by asserting
both economic substance arguments and arguments under other anti-abuse
rules, like section 269. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States,
844 F.3d 15, 19 n.3 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2295 (2017); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 991, 88-106 (D. Minn.
2014); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 3d 827, 846–52 (D.
Minn. 2015). But the trial courts rejected these other anti-abuse arguments.
See Santander Holdings USA, Inc., 844 F.3d at 19 n.3. At the appellate level
the government raised only the economic substance issue. It prevailed on that
issue, regarding challenged foreign tax credits, in the three appellate-level
STARS opinions. See id.; see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d
104, 120 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016); Salem
Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 942, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016). One STARS case, Wells Fargo, has yet to be
heard on appeal. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 09-CV-2764, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80401, 2017-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50, 235 (D. Minn. May 24,
2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017).
291 See, e.g., I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2013-52 I.R.B. 798 (providing guidance on dividend equivalents under section 871(m), and stating in the preamble that: “The
Treasury Department and the IRS will continue to closely scrutinize other
transactions that are not covered by section 871(m) and that may be used to
avoid U.S. taxation and U.S. withholding. In addition, the IRS may challenge the
U.S. tax results claimed in connection with transactions that are designed to
avoid the application of section 871(m) using all available statutory provisions
and judicial doctrines (including the substance over form doctrine, the economic
substance doctrine under section 7701(o), the step transaction doctrine, and tax
ownership principles as appropriate”); I.R.S. Notice CCA 201312045 (Mar. 22,
2013) (“judicial doctrines, including the economic substance doctrine, can be
used to challenge a foreign tax credit claim that otherwise meets the technical requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and relevant regulations”).
292 See supra text accompanying notes 201, 261 (regarding standing issues).
290
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as compared to agency action.293 Agency inaction has previously
been viewed as an exercise of agency discretion, as part of an
agency’s use of its expertise to set enforcement priorities.294
Also, inaction may be viewed as less impactful on members
of the public than action.295 Depending on the facts, that general
conclusion might be debatable: IRS refusal to apply the economic
substance doctrine does not harm the specific taxpayers who engaged in particular (otherwise subject to challenge) transactions,
but it does harm the U.S. Treasury by giving up on large amounts
(hundreds of millions) of dollars of tax revenue. In turn, that lack
of revenue indirectly harms many taxpayers who otherwise would
have benefitted from the government’s use of those dollars (to keep
open a military base, hire additional workers, pay food stamp
benefits, etc.).
The theory that agency inaction is not reviewable, because
it is less likely to harm the public (compared to agency action), is
consistent with the idea that taxpayer-favorable agency decisions should be less subject to review (and less circumscribed)
than taxpayer-unfavorable agency guidance.296 Yet, as discussed
above, whether an agency action (or inaction) is taxpayer favorable or unfavorable may not be that easy to distinguish, and
may depend on which taxpayers one focuses on.297
293 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1664–75 (2004). However, the result has sometimes been different where the IRS refuses to issue regulations
that are required by the statute (where such lack of regulations disadvantages taxpayers). See, e.g., American Air Liquide, Inc. v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 23,
27 (2001); Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 25, 38 (1997).
294 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized
on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”).
295 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (“when an agency refuses to act it generally
does not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights,
and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect.
Similarly, when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus
for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in
some manner.”).
296 See generally Bressman, supra note 293, at 1664–75 (discussing courts’
general reluctance to allow challenges to agency inaction).
297 Cf. Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 177–81
(2015) (discussing the effects of the non-enforcement of use taxes).
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Nor is it clear that agencies often decline to enforce an entire statutory section (as opposed to a single sentence, phrase, or
word within a statutory framework).298 IRS disinclination to apply
an entire codified doctrine may be especially concerning given the
clear Congressional intent (evidenced by the enactment of associated penalties) that the economic substance doctrine should be
applied and should be used to collect penalties (thus raising revenue for the Treasury).299
B. Selected Additional Impacts of Codification
1. Impact on the Application of Other Anti-abuse Doctrines
a. May Push the IRS and Courts to Try Other Anti-abuse
Rules Instead
Section 7701(o) may have the (apparently unintended) effect of pushing the courts and the IRS to use other anti-abuse
rules rather than the economic substance doctrine. The legislative
history to section 7701(o) states that codification of the economic
substance doctrine was not meant to affect other judicial antiabuse doctrines.300 But the IRS’s desire to avoid imposing the
section 7701(o)-related penalties (and, to a lesser extent, potential
restrictions on the economic substance doctrine’s ability to adapt
over time, after codification)301 may cause an increased emphasis
on alternative anti-abuse approaches. The courts may similarly
avoid the economic substance doctrine, if they also attempt to avoid
the strict liability penalties associated with section 7701(o).
See generally Osofsky, supra note 284, at 73–75.
H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010); see also supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing revenue estimates).
300 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 298 (“No inference is intended as to the
proper application of the economic substance doctrine under present law. In
addition, the provision shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any
other rule of law, including any common-law doctrine or provision of the Code
or regulations or other guidance thereunder; and the provision shall be construed as being additive to any such other rule of law.”); see also JOINT COMM.
REP., supra note 53, at 15 (same).
301 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing substantive impact of
codification).
298
299
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The IRS could try instead to apply statutory anti-abuse rules
like section 269,302 or judicial anti-abuse doctrines like substance
over form, business purpose, or the step transaction doctrine.303
It could also assert regulatory anti-abuse rules that are specific
to particular tax areas or tax benefits, such as the partnership
anti-abuse regulations304 (relating to partnership issues). The IRS
and Treasury could also issue specific new regulations that more
narrowly target particular transactions, such as the “foreign tax
credit generator regulations” that responded to the STARS
transactions.305
In fact, the IRS appears to be already using alternative
approaches, rather than the economic substance doctrine, where
it can.306 IRS guidance to examiners suggests that they not raise
economic substance as an issue unless it is the only or the strongest
argument.307 Oddly, the IRS seems as motivated to avoid economic
substance arguments as taxpayers are.308
b. Puts More Pressure on Distinguishing Between
Economic Substance and Other Judicial Doctrines
Section 7701(o) increases the importance of distinguishing
between the economic substance doctrine and other judicial antiabuse doctrines (such as the substance-over-form, business purpose,
302 See I.R.C. § 269 (2014). The government raised section 269 and similar
arguments in the lower courts in some of the STARS cases, but lost on these
issues in the trial courts and did not pursue such arguments on appeal. See
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 3d 239 (D.
Mass. 2015), rev’d, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2016), and cert. denied, 2017 U.S.
LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C.
15 (2013), on rehearing, T.C. Memo. 2013-225, and aff’d, 801 F.3rd 104 (2d. Cir.
2015), and cert. denied sub nom. 136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United
States, 786 F. 3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016).
303 Notices 2004-19 and 2004-20, for example, contain lists of rules and
doctrines (other than the economic substance doctrine) that the IRS might
apply in situations that it finds abusive. I.R.S. Notice 2004-19, 2004-11 I.R.B.
606; I.R.S. Notice 2004-20, 2004-11 I.R.B 608.
304 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995).
305 See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv); see also Rosenberg, supra note 63, at
235–49 (discussing possible alternative approaches the Treasury could take,
by regulation, to address foreign tax credit claims that are seen as abusive).
306 Jensen, supra note 60, at 30.
307 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011).
308 Id.
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step transaction,309 and sham transaction310 doctrines). That inquiry was mostly of theoretical interest before.311 Historically,
See Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2017)
(discussing the substance over form doctrine and declining to apply it to disallow
tax benefits from a transaction, where the transaction predated section
7701(o)’s effective date); CNT Inv’rs v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 161, 192–93 (2015)
(discussing the overlap and distinctions between step transaction and sham
transaction doctrines for a transaction before the effective date of section 7701(o));
In re Wyly, 552 B.R. 338, 514–16 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016) (discussing the economic
substance, substance over form, and step transaction doctrines, regarding a
transaction that occurred before section 7701(o)’s effective date). See generally
Philip Sancilio, Note, Clarifying (or is it Codifying?) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step
Transactions, Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138,
148–49 (2013) (comparing post-section 7701(o) economic substance doctrine
with the step transaction doctrine).
310 Unlike the other doctrines listed in the text above, the sham transaction doctrine is sometimes used as an interchangeable term for the economic
substance doctrine. At other times, sham transaction doctrine has a different
meaning than economic substance. Such different meanings can include factual
shams, in which the alleged events (such as sales or indebtedness) did not actually
occur, as compared to economic or substantive shams, in which the alleged events
did occur but arguably did not have the asserted tax effects. See Knetsch v.
United States, 364 United States 361, 366 (1960) (using the “sham” terminology
while disallowing tax benefits related to purported debt); Goldstein v. Comm’r,
364 F.2d 734, 737–42 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that loans and interest were not
“shams,” but that interest deductions were disallowed as lacking sufficient substance). See generally Jasper L. Cummings, The Sham Transaction Doctrine,
145 TAX NOTES 1239, 1242 (2014); Karen Nelson Moore, Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to Combating Tax Avoidance,
41 FLA. L. REV. 659, 659 (1989).
311 See, e.g., Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. U.S., 844 F.3d 15, 21 n.9 (1st
Cir. 2016) (“The First Circuit has addressed challenges to the economic substance of transactions in a number of cases, although the cases often have not
invoked the ‘economic substance doctrine’ by that name.”) (citations omitted).
Santander describes the Supreme Court’s Frank Lyon opinion as “clarify[ing]” the economic substance doctrine, even though the Frank Lyon case
referred to “this doctrine of substance over form.” See Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978); see also CNT Inv’rs, 144 T.C. at 192–
93 (applying the step transaction doctrine, discussing the evolution of various
doctrines from Gregory, and stating that “[t]he parties’ arguments implicate
three closely related and frequently conflated legal doctrines: the economic
substance doctrine, the sham transaction doctrine, and the step transaction
doctrine. Although these doctrines’ distinct names might suggest corresponding substantive distinctions, the lines between and among them blur upon
examination ....”); H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 292 (2010) (“These common-law
309
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there has been substantial overlap between various anti-abuse
doctrines (such as substance-over-form, business purpose, step
transaction, and economic substance), and it is not always easy
to distinguish them from each other.312 In the past, it has not
mattered much—if a tax benefit was disallowed under a judicial
anti-abuse doctrine, the precisely accurate name of that doctrine
was not important.313 That is likely to change now that section
7701(o) has taken effect.314
First, the imposition of enhanced penalties (twenty or forty
percent, with no reasonable cause exception) for tax deficiencies
asserted under the economic substance doctrine315 may increase the
need to distinguish between economic substance (and “similar
doctrines are not entirely distinguishable, and their application to a given set
of facts is often blurred by the courts, the IRS, and litigants.”). The court in
CNT Investors did not apply the economic substance doctrine “because the
Government has not invoked the doctrine and because, in any event, the case
may be resolved through the application of other principles.” CNT Inv’rs, 144
T.C. at 197 n.38. The court referred to Notice 2014-58 as demonstrating the
“remaining uncertainty as to the scope, contours, and sources of economic
substance and the other, noncodified judicial doctrines.” Id. at 193. The case
concerned a transaction that occurred before section 7701(o)’s effective date,
so the strict liability penalties enacted with that section would not have applied even if the judge had chosen to raise the economic substance doctrine
sua sponte.
312 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15,
2011).
313 See id.
314 See Amy S. Elliott, CNT Investors Shines Light on Courts’ Use of Inexact Doctrines, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 13, 2015, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax
-notes/penalties/cnt-investors-shines-light-courts-use-inexact-doctrines/2015
/04/13/qylr?highlight=%29%20CNT%20Investors%20Shines%20Light%20on%20
Courts%E2%80%99%20Use%20of%20Inexact%20Doctrines%20CNT%20Inves
tors%20Shines%20Light%20on%20Courts%E2%80%99%20Use%20of%20Inex
act%20Doctrines (quoting practitioner Monte Jackel’s comments on the CNT
Investors case: “‘This judge is basically admitting that many times these judges
don’t know which doctrine they’re applying,’ Jackel said. He questioned whether
such an approach can survive in a post-codified economic substance doctrine
world.”); Elliott, supra note 16 (discussing a practitioner’s complaint that the
court in Kenna Trading LLC et al. v. Commissioner should have used the substance over form doctrine rather than the economic substance doctrine: “Gomez
noted that while the opinion uses the words ‘economic substance,’ it does so as
part of what’s really a substance-over-form analysis, making the use of those
words ‘unfortunate.’”).
315 See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015).
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rules of law”)316 on the one hand, and other judicial anti-abuse doctrines on the other,317 in order to determine whether such enhanced penalties apply.
Secondly, only the economic substance doctrine triggers the
specific rules of section 7701(o) (two prongs, substantial reasonably
expected profit required before profit potential can be considered, substantial non-tax purpose, rules about whether financial
accounting and state tax effects can be taken into account,
etc.).318 If either the government or the taxpayer wants to avoid
the rules of section 7701(o), that party could argue that another
Code or regulatory rule, or another judicial doctrine, applies instead
of the economic substance analysis.319
Therefore, the distinction between the economic substance
doctrine and other judicial anti-abuse doctrines can now affect
whether the taxpayer wins or loses (as well as impacting penalties) by determining whether section 7701(o) (and its associated
penalties) must be applied.320 Section 7701(o) may thus have the
effect of opening up new lines of analysis for courts, commentators,
Tax deficiencies attributable to “similar rules of law” are subject to the same
strict liability penalties as deficiencies arising under the economic substance
doctrine (as defined in section 7701(o)). See §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676; § 6664(d).
However, the IRS has indicated that there are no other anti-abuse rules or
doctrines that it will treat as similar doctrines, practically speaking. See supra
discussion at Section II.B; supra notes 130–47 and accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., Vanik, supra note 123, at 110–11 (if taxpayers must pay a tax deficiency, they may be motivated to characterize the deficiency as arising under
other judicial doctrines rather than under the economic substance doctrine,
in order to avoid the strict liability penalties associated with the latter).
318 See generally § 7701(o) (2012).
319 See Vanik, supra note 123, at 111.
320 Query how often a taxpayer might be able to win a challenge based on
another judicial anti-abuse doctrine when it would have lost on 7701(o)-impacted
economic substance. A full discussion of that possibility is beyond the scope of
this Article. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 298 (2010) (section 7701(o) “shall not
be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule of law, including any
common-law doctrine or provision of the Code or regulations or other guidance thereunder; and the provision shall be construed as being additive to any
such other rule of law”); Jensen, supra note 19, at 25, n.148 (discussing the potential impact of the codification of the economic substance doctrine on other
doctrines, including whether Congress intended to favor economic substance
over other doctrines, and pointing out that the Joint Committee report disclaims
any Congressional intent to alter the application of any other doctrines by codifying the economic substance doctrine).
316
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and taxpayers, regarding the definitions of and distinctions between various judicial anti-abuse doctrines, due to increased emphasis on such distinctions.321
2. Impact on Validity of the Economic Substance Doctrine
Another interesting issue raised by section 7701(o) is
whether it affects the legal strength of arguments about the validity
of the economic substance doctrine.322 Both before and after section
7701(o), various commentators argued that the economic substance
doctrine is not a valid exercise of judicial authority.323 The Coltec
lower court also accepted such an argument, on the grounds that
separation of powers prevented such actions by the courts.324
The validity issue could be viewed as moot in that case, because
the court held that the transaction met the economic substance
test in any event and therefore should be respected.325 This lower
court opinion was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that the doctrine of economic substance is
valid and that the transaction failed to meet such doctrine’s requirements.326 The House Report accompanying section 7701(o)
describes the lower and appellate court opinions in Coltec, without commenting on any potential impact of section 7701(o) on
321 The IRS second directive to its employees suggests that examiners use
a different doctrine if available. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015,
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). This only helps taxpayers avoid the enhanced penalties if such alternative doctrine is not “similar” to the economic
substance doctrine within the meaning of the enhanced penalty provisions and
Notice 2014-58. Id.
322 This discussion focuses on the narrower issue of the impact of section
7701(o) on arguments about the validity of the economic substance doctrine.
A complete discussion of the merits of such validity arguments is beyond the
scope of this Article.
323 See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, The Supreme Court’s Economic Substance
Doctrine Opinion, 149 TAX NOTES 1295, 1295–97 (2015) (continuing to argue that
the economic substance doctrine is invalid, even after the enactment of section
7701(o)); Amandeep S. Grewal, Economic Substance and the Supreme Court, 116
TAX NOTES 969, 970 (2007) (contending that the economic substance doctrine is
invalid under Supreme Court case law and principles of statutory interpretation).
324 See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 753 (2004), vacated and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
325 Id. at 755–56.
326 Coltec Indus., Inc., 454 F.3d at 1360.
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validity arguments.327 Perhaps Congress thought that either the
appellate reversal of the lower court’s Coltec opinion, or codification, ended any concerns about the validity of the doctrine.
Whether section 7701(o) changes taxpayers’ and courts’
ability to argue that the economic substance doctrine is always
invalid—i.e., never applies, because the courts do not have the legal
ability to apply such a doctrine—depends on the asserted reason
for such invalidity. The statute’s enactment quite clearly signals
Congressional approval of the economic substance doctrine (even
though the doctrine was developed by the courts and did not originate with Congress).328 This is especially important because the
economic substance doctrine’s function is the interpretation of
Congressional intent.329
Therefore, arguments for invalidity on the grounds that the
economic substance doctrine violates Congressional intent should
decrease in force.330 (Similar arguments about Congressional intent
H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 293 (2010).
The House Report describes the reason for enacting section 7701(o) as
follows:
A strictly rule-based tax system cannot efficiently prescribe
the appropriate outcome of every conceivable transaction that
might be devised and is, as a result, incapable of preventing all
unintended consequences. Thus, many courts have long recognized the need to supplement tax rules with anti-tax-avoidance
standards, such as the economic substance doctrine, in order to
assure the Congressional purpose is achieved. The Committee
recognizes that the IRS has achieved a number of recent successes in litigation. The Committee believes it is still desirable to
provide greater clarity and uniformity in the application of the
economic substance doctrine in order to improve its effectiveness at deterring unintended consequences.
H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (emphasis added). That certainly sounds like
Congressional approval. In fact, the House specifically said that it wanted the
economic substance doctrine to be more effective. Id.
329 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
330 Some commentators argued that codification would actually prevent any
further challenges to the validity of the economic substance doctrine, although
courts could still find that the doctrine was not applicable to particular fact
patterns. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial AntiAbuse Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX REV. 579, 586 (2014) (“For those judges, particularly textualists, who may have been hesitant to impose the judicially created
doctrines, codification removes their choice.”); see also Marvin A. Chirelstein
& Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105
327
328
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may still be available as part of a separate “relevance” inquiry by
the courts, in particular cases. But relevance pertains to whether a
specific type of tax benefit, like the low income housing credit,
was not intended to be subject to economic substance scrutiny. It
does not address whether the entire doctrine of economic substance
is invalid and therefore never applies.). In order for a court to
decide that the economic substance doctrine never applies to any
transaction (due to invalidity), a court now would have to overcome government arguments that section 7701(o) shows Congressional approval of the doctrine. In other words, the court would
need a reason for invalidity that does not depend on an asserted
violation of Congressional intent. 331
However, section 7701(o) might not affect the strength of
an argument that separation of powers principles (rather than
Congressional intent) do not allow the courts to override compliance with the literal rules of the Code and regulations. One could
argue that Congress cannot waive that issue.332 Regardless of the
merits of such arguments about the separation of powers, such
merits likely are not significantly changed by the enactment of
section 7701(o).
Alternatively, the economic substance doctrine could potentially be viewed as a rule of statutory interpretation333 (perhaps
COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1950 (2005) (discussing, before section 7701(o)’s enactment, the possible impact of future codification: “Although codification would
prevent a court from concluding that the doctrine does not exist, courts would
remain free to conclude that the doctrine is not relevant in particular situations.”). But treating section 7701(o) as ending validity arguments seems to be
an overstatement, because there may be some asserted grounds for invalidity
of the doctrine that are not waivable by Congress, as well as the arguments
(discussed infra) that Congress could not amend a judicial doctrine that did
not already exist.
331 In addition, in response to arguments that the courts cannot (are not
authorized by Congress to) disallow benefits that meet all of the technical requirements of the Code, the IRS can argue that section 7701(o) (and its two
prongs and other rules) are now part of the literal, technical requirements to
receive certain tax benefits.
332 If Congress cannot waive any separation of powers issue that affects
the economic substance doctrine, perhaps it could not enact a general anti-abuse
rule (GAAR) either.
333 For example, Santander characterized the economic substance doctrine
as a rule of statutory interpretation. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v.
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akin to the rule that courts do not give effect to proposed interpretations that are manifestly incompatible with Congressional intent,
or that are nonsensical).334 If that is the case, then section 7701(o)
potentially strengthens arguments in favor of the economic substance doctrine’s validity, by showing Congressional approval of
such an economic substance rule of statutory construction.
On the one hand, section 7701(o)’s phrasing seems to assume that the economic substance doctrine exists and is valid.335
On the other, it does not purport to create such a doctrine itself,
if the economic substance doctrine was already (before enactment)
invalid.336 Instead, section 7701(o) asserts that it only clarifies
(according to the statutory provision’s title) or “clarif[ies] and enhance[s]” (in the words of the legislative history)337 an existing
doctrine. But if Congress was wrong about economic substance
existing as a valid judicial doctrine, that would make section 7701(o)
entirely meaningless. Such a judicial finding of invalidity of the
United States, 844 F.3d 15, 15 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal footnotes omitted)
(“The federal income tax is, and always has been, based on statute. The economic substance doctrine, like other common law tax doctrines, can thus
perhaps best be thought of as a tool of statutory interpretation ....”).
334 See, e.g., Gardner v. Comm’r, 954 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992) (citing statutory construction rules
against finding absurd results, in support of court’s application of the economic substance doctrine); Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 54–55 (3d Cir.
1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 590 (1991). See generally Veronica M.
Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 127 (1994); Steven
Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes—Or Not: Plain Meaning and Other Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321 (2009); Robert W. Scheef, Temporal
Dynamics in Statutory Interpretation: Courts, Congress, and the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 529, 555 (2003).
335 See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2018).
336 See id.
337 See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010); see also JT. COMM. ON
TAX’N, JCX-18-10, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
THE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010, AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 156 (2010) (saying that section
7701(o) “clarified and enhanced” the economic substance doctrine). Section
7701(o)’s own title says that it is a “clarification,” but it was enacted by section 1409 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, which
referred to “Codification.” Although enhancement, clarification, and codification
differ somewhat in their meaning, all connote that the economic substance doctrine already existed, and was not newly created by section 7701(o).

2018]

ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE

263

economic substance doctrine would thus need a rationale strong
enough to overcome the bias against finding statutory language to
be moot, under general principles of statutory interpretation.338
Taxpayers might potentially argue that by leaving relevance
to the courts “as if this subsection had never been enacted,” 339
section 7701(o) leaves the courts to determine the validity of the
doctrine and implies that it might be invalid.340 But relevance and
validity are two different concepts. The relevance rule addresses
not whether the economic substance doctrine is valid (i.e., exists)
but whether specific tax benefits are exempt from application of the
doctrine. Section 7701(o) applies only when the economic substance doctrine is “relevant.”341 As quoted above, the rule leaving
the relevance determination to the courts says that courts can
determine “whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to
a transaction.”342 The phrasing indicates a case-specific determination for each transaction. This language appears to assume
that the doctrine is valid and to focus instead on whether such
valid doctrine applies to a particular transaction or not. Otherwise, relevance issues do not appear to affect arguments about
the underlying validity of the economic substance doctrine.
There is also an argument that, even if the economic substance doctrine were found to technically not have existed (to have
been invalid) before section 7701(o)’s enactment, it exists (is valid)
after section 7701(o). Under this theory, one would argue that
Congress essentially created an economic substance test (or created a modified version of a test that had existed, in differing forms,
in the various circuits) and that (after codification) Congress
See supra note 132 and accompanying text; cf. Marie Sapirie, News
Analysis: Will the Supreme Court Take Up Economic Substance?, 150 TAX NOTES
36 (2016) (“‘Section 7701(o) begins by saying that the doctrine applies only when
it is relevant and thus seems to confer congressional imprimatur on the notion
that the doctrine is part of common law,’ said Monte A. Jackel of Jackel Tax Law.
‘If there is no such doctrine, then Congress acted unnecessarily,’ he said.”).
339 See § 7701(o)(1) (lead-in language) (“In the case of any transaction to which
the economic substance doctrine is relevant ….”); id. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction
shall be made in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.”).
340 For an example of such an argument, see Cummings, supra note 323,
at text accompanying n.52.
341 See § 7701(o).
342 See id. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
338
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allowed the courts to decide only whether the doctrine applies to
particular transactions, not whether it exists at all. This argument derives some support from the fact that Congress imposed
some significant changes on the previous forms of the doctrine—
including the ratio test that must be met before profit potential
can be taken into account under either prong.343 One could argue
that section 7701(o) itself authorizes the judiciary to apply two
prongs to evaluate asserted tax benefits where the courts think
such analysis is appropriate (i.e., relevant), even if the economic
substance doctrine were found not to have existed before.
Overall, although arguments about the validity or invalidity of economic substance as a judicial doctrine are interesting, it
seems extremely unlikely that the courts would hold the doctrine to be invalid, given the many, many times that multiple
circuits have applied the doctrine without finding it invalid or
raising this issue.344 The Supreme Court has not itself decided a
recent case that uses the term “economic substance,” but it has applied similar approaches and doctrines (e.g., “substance over form”
in Frank Lyon,345 and a basic anti-abuse concept in Gregory).346
One element that these previous Supreme Court decisions have
in common with the economic substance doctrine (among other
things) is a willingness to consider whether a tax benefit that meets
all of the written Code and regulatory requirements should
nonetheless be denied.347
In any event, even if section 7701(o) leaves open the possibility that the Supreme Court could find that the economic substance doctrine does not exist (despite dozens of court cases), e.g.,
because it is not within the courts’ power to create such a doctrine,
that might not be the end of the economic substance analysis.
Congress could potentially just amend section 7701(o) to create an
economic substance rule, similar to a GAAR.348 Instead of a judicial
Id. § 7701(o)(2)(A).
See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 293 (2010).
345 See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978).
346 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
347 See Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 573; Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
348 See generally Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General
Anti-Avoidance Rules, 54 SMU L. REV. 83, 117 (2001) (discussing GAARs generally); Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 27 VA. TAX REV. 833 (2008); Daniel
Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW 807, 809 (1995); Zoe
343
344
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doctrine, economic substance would become primarily a statutory
rule. Section 7701(o) certainly shows Congressional approval of (a
version of) the economic substance doctrine, so Congressional
amendments to create such a statutory doctrine (if the judicial
doctrine is overturned) seem quite possible, as long as the reason for invalidity is something other than separation of powers
issues. Thus, debates about validity or invalidity of the judicial
doctrine may ultimately be moot (because any finding of invalidity may simply be superseded by later legislation).349
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Section 7701(o) incorporated the long-standing doctrine of
economic substance into statutory language. Such “codification”
is a rare instance of legislation that mandates the content of a
court-created doctrine, and that also gives an agency the regulatory authority to change and impact that judicial doctrine. Codification thus raises issues regarding the interaction of the three
branches of the federal government.
In addition, Congress apparently expected that codification of the economic substance doctrine would strengthen the
doctrine and result in increased federal tax revenues, partly as a
result of strict liability penalties that were enacted with section
7701(o).350 Instead, such penalties seem to have deterred the IRS
from raising the economic substance doctrine, so that codification has weakened the economic substance doctrine rather than
making it a stronger weapon for tax collection. Section 7701(o)
thus presents interesting issues regarding the bounds of agency
authority and agency enforcement discretion.
The IRS’s publicly communicated reluctance to raise economic substance issues, implemented by means of internal letters,
and its notices (which state, among other things, that the IRS will
Prebble & John Prebble, Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income
Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of Abuse of Law, 62 BULL. INT’L TAX’N
(Apr. 2008) (describing GAARs in other countries).
349 Even if validity arguments are moot in the long term (because Congress
could choose to create, rather than just modify, an economic substance doctrine
in the future), current validity arguments may still be crucial for particular
taxpayers, who could benefit from arguing that the economic substance doctrine is invalid for the years in which their transactions occurred.
350 See supra text accompanying notes 272–73.
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continue to apply pre-section-7701(o) case law), also raise questions
about the issuance of rules by informal means, without notice and
comment procedures.
The strict liability penalties associated with section 7701(o),
in addition to IRS disinclination to raise economic substance issues,
may encourage courts and government litigators to turn to other
doctrines where they might previously have raised economic substance issues. Section 7701(o) may thus make it more important
to distinguish between anti-abuse doctrines in the future, compared to pre-codification periods.
Lastly, section 7701(o) clearly signals Congressional approval
of the judicial doctrine of economic substance.351 This hinders
arguments that the economic substance doctrine is invalid, except to the extent that such contentions are based on separation
of powers issues or other grounds that the Congress does not
have the ability to waive.
Overall, section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code (which
now governs the application of the economic substance doctrine)
seems to have had the unintended effect of causing the economic
substance doctrine (and the recently enacted penalties associated
with that doctrine) to be applied very rarely. Rather than merely
translating the existing economic substance doctrine into legislative language, or strengthening it, section 7701(o) seems to have
accidentally deterred the agency from raising the issue. Although
there are valid arguments about the agency’s ability to make (and
publicly communicate) these enforcement and interpretation
choices, few litigants are likely to bring a legal challenge against
such taxpayer-favorable agency action.
The economic substance doctrine may thus be restricted in
the future, as a practical matter, to the “worst of the worst” cases,
in which claims for unintended tax benefits appear truly egregious.
Those may be the only instances in which the agency is still willing to assert the doctrine. No case has yet interpreted section
7701(o). If the IRS remains willing to apply economic substance
arguments to the most egregious cases, then judicial examination
of section 7701(o) may take place soon.

351

See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 293 (2010).

